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The pursuit of synergy, where the whole exceeds the sum of the parts, inspires the 
formation of teams: working together, team members can create synergy, and hence 
value, for a firm.  This dissertation explores the interaction of synergy and team member 
characteristics under various performance measurement regimes.  Specifically, I 
analytically model the impact of this interaction on the explicit and implicit incentives 
facing each team member and the resulting types and amounts of effort that team 
members choose.  The results indicate that team composition and synergy play an 
important role in determining which performance measurement regime generates the 
highest agency welfare.  A high-synergy setting favors the inclusion of a team output 
measure that encompasses this synergy, whereas a lower-synergy setting may favor 
individual input measures that do not reflect this synergy.  Accordingly, no one 
performance measurement regime dominates in all circumstances.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines synergy as “the interaction of two or 
more agents or forces so that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their 
individual effects.”  The pursuit of synergy inspires the formation of teams: working 
together, team members can create synergy, and hence value, for a firm.  This dissertation 
explores the interaction of synergy and team member characteristics under various 
performance measurement regimes.  Specifically, I study the impact of this interaction on 
the explicit and implicit incentives facing each team member and the resulting types and 
amounts of effort that team members choose. 
This is an important research topic because of the extensive economic impact of 
teams in business: every firm is essentially a team attempting to generate synergy.  Not 
only is there a lot of money at stake, but creating synergy is difficult to do.  In practice, 
different experts make conflicting recommendations to firms seeking to induce teamwork 
and reap the benefits of synergy.  This analysis attempts to reconcile this contradictory 
guidance and clarify the role of each of several forces contributing to synergy. 
This dissertation presents three analytic models of teams and synergy.  The first 
model develops a one-period benchmark in which team members have different cost 
advantages, or “expertise.”  The second model builds on the one-period base model by 
adding a second period; here, team members have different levels of career concerns and 
no performance measures are contractible.  The third model extends this two-period 
setting to include contractible performance measures.   
In all three models, two team members each choose two types of effort: the first, 
teamwork, increases their teammate’s marginal productivity and the second, individual 
effort, has no impact on their teammate’s marginal productivity.  Synergy is modeled as 
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the interaction between agents produced by teamwork.  All models vary the performance 
measurement regime by manipulating the performance measures available for 
observation and/or contracting.  Performance measurement regimes considered include a 
regime where only a team output measure is available, a regime where only individual 
input measures are available, and a regime where a mix of team output and individual 
inputs is available. 
The results indicate that when team members influence each other’s marginal 
productivity via teamwork, each agent’s teamwork choice depends not only on his own 
incentive weights and characteristics, but also on the incentive weights and characteristics 
of his teammate. Further, I find that no one performance measurement regime dominates 
in all circumstances.   
In a one-period model, ceteris paribus, higher potential synergy favors team 
output regimes whereas a higher ratio of team-to-task expertise favors individual input 
regimes.  In a two-period model with non-contractible performance measures, the 
potential for synergy interacts with career concerns to produce collaborative effort.  In a 
high synergy environment, firms are better off having at least one performance measure 
sensitive to potential synergy, or team members under-invest in teamwork.  Conversely, 
in a low synergy environment, firms are better off having at least one performance 
measure that is not sensitive to potential synergy, or team members over-invest in 
teamwork.  Further, even in the absence of explicit costs for each performance measure, 
more performance measures are not necessarily better. 
In a two-period model with contractible performance measures, firms are better 
off with higher synergy potential and teams of agents with low career concerns (“senior 
agents”).  In general, synergy reinforces the benefit from senior agents.  This contrasts 
with non-contractible performance measurement regimes, where firms are better off with 
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teams of agents with high career concerns (“junior agents”), and synergy causes those 
junior agents to be even more valuable to the firm.  The reason for this difference is that 
in the absence of explicit incentives, a firm must rely on career concerns to induce effort 
(so the more career concerns, the more effort), whereas when a firm can induce effort via 
explicit incentives, career concerns distort the effort level away from the second best 
level (and the more career concerns, the more distortion).  
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Chapter 2:  Team Synergy, Team Composition and Performance 
Measures 
2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
Team synergy occurs when a team’s output exceeds the sum of the output of the 
team members working individually.1 However, synergy requires more than merely 
assigning individuals to a team (Lawford [2003], Salas, Burke, & Cannon-Bowers 
[2000]).  It is enabled by a collaborative environment, which is created by a firm 
establishing and then maintaining a corporate culture that nurtures and reinforces 
teamwork.2  As part of this process, many firms employ explicit team-based incentives 
(Parker, McAdams, & Zielinski [2000]).  In practice, guidance to firms on the appropriate 
performance measures for inducing teamwork differs.  For example, Lawford [2003] 
recommends that firms not single out individual team members for special 
acknowledgement, to prevent competitiveness that can damage a collaborative 
environment.  On the other hand, Parker et al. [2000] advise firms to “send the right 
message” by reinforcing teamwork and individual performance.  This chapter attempts to 
reconcile this contradictory advice by examining several factors that influence a firm’s 
effectiveness at inducing teamwork to reap the benefits of synergy, under various 
performance measurement regimes.   
The level of teamwork a firm can induce using incentives ultimately depends on 
the type of performance measures available to the firm.  In an ideal world, performance 
measurement in a team-based setting is straightforward: a firm perfectly observes both 
 
1 Synergy is also cited as the justification for strategic alliances and company mergers/acquisitions.  I do 
not consider this scenario.  Rather, I focus on operational synergy within a firm. 
2 The importance of a collaborative environment is evidenced by PeopleSoft’s firing of its CEO, Craig 
Conway, citing concerns that its collaborative work style was in danger (Clark [2004]). 
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the individual contributions of each team member and the total value generated by a 
team.  However, in reality, synergy creates a number of measurement problems that 
complicate the use of incentive plans. 
One fundamental problem is measuring how much value each individual team 
member provides.  Alchian and Demsetz [1972] assert that in a team setting it is 
prohibitively costly to ascertain the marginal product of each team member.  But, even if 
such practicalities are overcome and marginal products of each team member are 
available, Rose [2002] demonstrates the fundamental impossibility of paying each team 
member his marginal product because synergy causes the sum of the individual marginal 
products to exceed the collective marginal product. Furthermore, there is no reasonable 
way to allocate team synergy to individual team members (Watts [2003]). This allocation 
problem is similar to the classic managerial accounting “joint cost/benefit” problem.  
Failing the ability to measure and/or pay team members based on their marginal 
products, a firm may attempt to measure, as a proxy, effort inputs by team members.  For 
example, one measure of a team member’s individual effort is the time each team 
member devotes to production.  An example of a measure of a team member’s 
cooperative effort, or teamwork, is the time each team member invests in coordinating 
with other team members to improve performance. However, team settings are 
notoriously difficult for disentangling the effort contributions of individual team 
members as a result of the very synergy for which the team was formed (McAfee and 
McMillan [1991]).3  For example, attributing the total revenue generated by an 
 
3 A related problem, free-riding, is invited by the inability of firms to measure individual effort and/or 
marginal products of individual team members. Free-riding, also known as social loafing or shirking, 
occurs when team members do not internalize the full positive impact of their actions on their teammates.  
Thus, each individual provides less effort than is optimal for the team as a whole (as with the under-
provision of public goods) because the marginal benefit to the team is higher than the marginal benefit to 
the individual. 
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interdepartmental sales team to individual departments without double- and triple-
counting is often problematic.   
Another measurement problem in team settings is that sometimes a firm cannot 
quantify the benefits generated by a team, which implies that team output may not be 
available for contracting.  Firms find it difficult to put a dollar value on improvements in 
quality, productivity, customer satisfaction, employee turnover and cycle time. Despite 
this inability to measure results, firms still perceive that team-based incentive plans are 
good for the organization (Parker et al. [2000]). For example, even when a firm cannot 
directly measure the benefits of a major team-led IT implementation, the firm may still 
believe that the resulting information system provides substantial value. 
The research issue addressed in this chapter is important to firms because of the 
potentially high stakes involved and the difficulty involved in designing team-based 
incentives.  Che and Yoo [2001] cite numerous examples of successful teams that 
improved profits – generating additional revenue, increasing productivity, reducing 
engineering delays, and decreasing cycle times – by as much as $50 million at a single 
firm.  Porter [1996] claims that a firm’s very competitiveness is fundamentally driven by 
the synergistic fit among workers and the tasks they perform.  This question is also 
important to accounting researchers because it addresses the impact of performance 
measurement limitations on the ability of firms to generate synergy.  I manipulate the 
information environment a firm faces with respect to the availability of performance 
measures used to induce teamwork among its employees and analyze which measurement 
regimes perform better under which circumstances.   
In my model, workers perform two types of effort, individual effort and 
cooperative effort, with associated cost efficiencies (respectively, task expertise and team 
expertise).  This dichotomy is consistent with the categorization in the team literature of 
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team member competencies into task and team skills (Salas et al. [2000]).  Individual 
effort involves tasks that can be performed non-collaboratively (e.g., individual sales), 
whereas teamwork entails tasks which require coordination among workers (e.g., after-
sales service, involving communication across several departments).  The extant 
principal-agent literature considers the former type of effort extensively.  I focus on the 
latter and its role in generating synergy, which has received relatively little attention by 
modelers.  I emphasize teamwork because it is the mechanism by which team members 
interrelate, adapting and adjusting the timing of their individual actions to meet the 
demands placed upon the team.  Empirical evidence suggests that this coordination is 
essential to effective team performance (Salas et al. [2000]). 
This chapter presents a LEN model with two agents who each choose both 
individual effort and cooperative effort (i.e., teamwork).4  Both types of effort contribute 
to team output; however, for clarity, I refer to the effort with a marginal impact on 
teammates as “teamwork” and the effort with no marginal impact as individual effort.5  I 
model synergy as an increasing, concave function of teamwork, which takes a value of 
zero if either team member chooses no teamwork.  Team output, which may or may not 
be contractible, includes this synergy component, whereas the individual performance 
measures of teamwork and individual effort inputs do not.   
I find that when team members influence each other’s marginal productivity via 
teamwork, each agent’s teamwork choice depends not only on his own incentive weights 
and team expertise (i.e., cooperative effort cost advantage), but also on the incentive 
weights and team expertise of his teammate.  Further, I find that firm profit can be higher 
in either a team-output-based or a teamwork-input-based contracting regime.  An increase 
 
4  A LEN model assumes wage contracts that are Linear functions of the performance measures, agents 
with negative Exponential utility functions, and Normally distributed performance measures. 
5 I use the terms “teamwork” and “cooperative effort” interchangeably. 
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in team expertise is likely to benefit a firm with a task-focused team (i.e., relatively more 
task expertise than team expertise) most in a team-output-based contracting regime, 
whereas a firm with a team-focused team is likely to benefit most in a teamwork-input-
based contracting regime.  Finally, firm profit can be higher when contracting only on 
two types of input-based individual performance measures than when contracting on a 
blend of team output and one type of input measure.  Presuming the firm has a limited 
budget for implementing its performance measurement system and cannot afford to 
produce all measures, the most valuable measure(s) to the firm for contracting purposes 
depends not only on the precision of the measures, but also on team composition and the 
degree of synergy.   
  The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.  The next section reviews prior 
research.  The following section describes the model setup.  In the analysis section I 
manipulate the information environment and analyze the differences across performance 
measurement regimes.  The final section concludes and discusses limitations. 
2.2.  PRIOR RESEARCH 
This chapter builds on the existing analytic team and performance measurement 
literatures. The relevant team literature contains several discrete models and a small 
number of continuous models with a team synergy component; these models generally 
hold the performance measurement environment constant.  The performance 
measurement literature generally models the impact of performance measure 
characteristics on incentive compensation contracts (e.g., Feltham and Xie [1994], Dikolli 
[2001], Datar, Kulp, & Lambert [2001]).  My model bridges both literatures by 
examining the role of performance measure characteristics in the relatively unexplored 
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team synergy setting.6  Specifically, this chapter contributes to the team literature by 
comparing the impact of different information regimes on effort choices and overall team 
performance in a team synergy setting.  It contributes to the performance measurement 
literature by comparing the impact of team composition on effort choices and overall 
team performance in a team synergy setting. 
The team literature has many discrete models that incorporate a synergy-like 
component.  For example, Arya, Fellingham, & Glover [1997] and Che and Yoo [2001] 
model two identical agents who make binary effort choices, where the output from 
cooperative (high, high) effort can exceed the sum of the agents choosing high effort in 
isolation (high, low)7.  However, these papers assume a specific performance measure 
regime – a team performance measure only in Arya et al. [1997] and individual 
performance measures only in Che and Yoo [2001] – and focus on the role of the agent in 
inducing teamwork.  In contrast, I vary the availability of performance measures of 
continuous effort choices and focus on the principal’s role in inducing teamwork. 
Continuous models of teams with a synergy component are rare.  McAfee and 
McMillan [1991] model synergy in a team setting with n risk-neutral agents who choose 
a vector of continuous effort inputs.  Although primarily an adverse selection model, they 
consider the special case where adverse selection is absent.  Their main finding is that 
when the marginal cost/benefit ratio is non-decreasing in ability for all agents, the first-
best outcome can be attained using incentive contracts linear in team output alone.8  
While McAfee and McMillan [1991] do consider the incremental value of adding 
 
6 The research stream concerning task assignment/ task complementarities has a similar flavor in that it 
entails multiple agents and complementary tasks (e.g., Zhang [2003], Hemmer [1995]).  These papers 
examine the interaction of complementarity and job design/ organizational design (as opposed to 
performance measure characteristics), and they model exogenous complementarity across tasks rather than 
endogenous complementarity across agents (i.e., synergy). 
7 Similar examples include Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo [1993] and Itoh [1993]. 
8 That is, monitoring is unnecessary to eliminate free-riding for risk-neutral agents. Vanderveen [1995] 
extends this model to risk-averse agents and finds that monitoring does prevent some free-riding. 
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noiseless individual performance measures, the team-output-only regime weakly 
dominates any other performance measurement regime because the first-best solution can 
be attained.   
Holmstrom [1982] investigates moral hazard in teams of n agents who each make 
a single continuous effort choice.  However, he considers scenarios where synergy is 
completely allocated to individual agents or is not present.  In my model, synergy (by 
definition) causes the team output to exceed the sum of individual performance measures 
(i.e., it cannot be allocated to individual agents).  This assumption removes the “budget-
balancing constraint” that underlies Holmstrom’s model. Auriol, Friebel, & Pechlivanos 
[2002] develop a LEN model of two agents who each choose a single continuous effort 
that has a positive externality on the teammate.  As with Holmstrom [1982], team output 
is the sum of the individual agent outputs.  The externality, however, does not represent 
synergy per se because agents have no effect on their teammates’ marginal product.   
This chapter is most closely related to the Auriol et al. [2002] and Datar et al. 
[2001] models.  I extend the Auriol et al. [2002] model to include a nonlinear team 
synergy term in team output, and I introduce individual performance measures that do not 
capture this synergy. Thus, each team member’s teamwork has a marginal impact on the 
other’s productivity in team output that is not reflected in the individual measures. I 
extend the Datar et al. [2001] single-agent multiple-action model to a multiple-agent 
multiple-action model where each agent has different characteristics.   
2.3.  THE MODEL 
Consider a one-period model where a risk-neutral principal hires two risk- and 
effort-averse agents.  Each agent chooses individual effort, ei, and teamwork, ti.9  
 
9 Synergy could be represented with a single type of effort.  However, I use two types of effort because I 
want to model teamwork as a separate construct from individual effort.  I would like to highlight the 
contrast between effort that contributes to output additively (as in the prior literature) versus 
Individual effort is reflected in both team output, x, and an individual performance 
measure, yi, if one exists.  Likewise, teamwork is reflected in both team output, x, and an 
individual performance measure, zi, if one exists.  Synergy is a function of teamwork by 
the two agents: teamwork by one agent increases the other agent's marginal productivity. 
The timeline is as follows: 
Principal offers wage wi 
to each agent,  i=1,2. 
Agents each accept 
and choose (ei ,τi). 
Output and available measures 
are realized.  Agents are paid. 
 
Team output is a linearly additive function of individual efforts e1 and e2, a team 
synergy term, s(τ1τ2)1/2, and a transient shock, εx , as follows:10 
 1/ 21 2 1 2( ) xx e e s τ τ ε= + + +  
where s>0 is an exogenous parameter known to all parties that represents the strength of 
the synergy.11  Depending on the measurement regime, x may or may not be contractible. 
The individual performance measures, if they exist, are linearly additive functions 
of individual effort ei and teamwork τi and a transient shock, εyi and εzi, respectively: 
   1, 2i i yi
i i zi
y e
i
z
ε
τ ε
= + ⎫⎪ =⎬
= + ⎪⎭
For example, Parker et al. [2000] document that Ameritech internal audit services 
evaluates the time spent developing new audit methodologies (measure y) and the time 
spent sharing best practices with others (measure z) for its incentive plan.  In some cases, 
                                                                                                                                                 
multiplicatively (which creates the marginal interdependency between agents).  The combination of these 
two types of effort has the intuitive feature that team output when agents collaborate exceeds the sum of 
individual agent output when agents work individually (i.e., no teamwork). 
10 I model the synergy term as the square root of τ1τ2 to ensure an interior solution with a quadratic cost 
function for τ.  I find this assumption palatable because it implies synergy is increasing at a decreasing rate 
in teamwork. 
 11
11 Parameter s is analogous to the sensitivity of team output to teamwork, as modeled in Datar et al. [2001]. 
Modeling this parameter as a random variable is not feasible in the LEN setup because multiplying a choice 
variable (in this case, τ) by the random variable causes the agent’s choice to change the variance of the 
performance measure, which creates an insurmountable tractability problem (Lambert [2001]).  
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however, these individual performance measures might not be contractible.  Chase 
Manhattan found that its local performance measurement systems were incompatible with 
each other, which meant the desired data could not be collected.  This issue is common 
enough that one of the main takeaways in Parker et al. [2000] is for firms to assess the 
contractibility (i.e., availability and reliability) of performance measures when designing 
the plan.  Alternatively, meaningful measures of unobservable effort simply may not 
exist.  Consider a co-authored paper: when asked to self-report their percentage of the 
contribution, authors almost invariably split credit evenly with their co-authors. 
All transient shock terms are normally distributed with zero mean and variances 
σx2, σy12, σy22, σz12, and σz22 respectively, where the σ2 parameters are all positive and 
finite.  The variance terms represent the precision of each performance measure (i.e., 
higher values of σ2 imply less precise measures).  For example, a creative team might 
have performance measures with low precision, whereas a production team might have 
performance measures with high precision.   
The individual performance measures have corr(y1, y2)=ρy, corr(z1, z2)=ρz; for 
simplicity, I restrict these correlations to be non-negative (ρy, ρz≥0). The individual 
performance measures are independent, i.e., corr(yi, zi)=0.   The team output shock term, 
εx, is independent of the shock term in both individual performance measures.  One 
interpretation of the correlation ρy between the εyi shock terms is the degree of similarity 
between team members: a cross-functional team could have quite low correlations, 
whereas a specialized vertical team could have high correlations.  Similarly, the 
correlation ρz between the εzi shock terms might represent the extent to which teamwork 
is measured at the team level versus measured separately by each home department.  The 
performance measures are normally distributed as follows: 
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)
j
  
1/ 2 2
1 2 1 2
2
2
( ( ) ,
( , )
   1, 2
 ( , )
x
i i yi
i i zi
x N e e s
y N e
i
z N
τ τ σ
σ
τ σ
+ +
⎫⎪ =⎬
⎪⎭
∼
∼
∼
The principal offers each agent a wage based on the measures available for 
contracting.  For tractability, I assume contracts take the linear form: 
 ,    for , 1, 2,  i i i i i i j i i i jw x y y z z i j iα β γ δ κ λ= + + + + + = ≠  
where the incentive weight on any non-contractible measure equals zero. 
Each agent’s cost of effort is a twice-differentiable convex increasing function of 
individual effort and teamwork.  For simplicity, assume the costs of each type of effort 
are additively separable.  The cost to agent i for individual effort is decreasing in his task 
expertise, pi ≥1, and the cost of teamwork is decreasing in his team expertise, qi ≥1.12  
Total cost of effort has the following functional form: 
 2 21 1 ,    for 1, 2
2 2i i ii i
c e i
p q
τ= + =  (1) 
Each agent has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function: 
  exp{ [ ]}, 1,2i i i iU r w c i≡ − − − =  
                                                
where ri œ (0,¶) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for agent i.  For 
simplicity, and without loss of generality, assume each agent’s outside reservation utility 
equals zero.13  Task expertise, team expertise and risk aversion (pi, qi and ri) collectively 
represent team composition, or the characteristics of the team’s members. 
The principal is risk neutral and maximizes expected profit: 
 
12 Although outside the scope of this model, one might expect team members to possess skills appropriate 
to their working environment. For example, high team expertise would be useful in project management, 
but task expertise is less useful.  Writing software code requires high task expertise but not necessarily 
team expertise.  A lead attorney in a complex trial requires both high task expertise and high team 
expertise, whereas a retail clerk might not need high expertise of either type. 
13 Alternatively, each agent’s reservation utility could be a function of his individual characteristics, which 
are known to all parties.  However, in a static model, the principal will merely adjust the fixed wage αi to 
ensure the outside reservation utility is met, and the slope of the pay-for-performance will be unchanged. 
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where Nœ{X, Y, Z, XY, YZ} refers to the regime where only performance measures n œ{x, 
y, z, (x,y), (y,z)} respectively are available for contracting.  Here, (PC) represents the 
participation constraint and (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint. 
2.4.  ANALYSIS 
In this section, I manipulate the information environment a firm faces.  The 
performance measures that a firm has available for contracting depend on the nature of 
the team project and the types of activities team members undertake.  Some activities and 
projects are inherently less measurable than others.  For example, straightforward 
production tasks are more measurable than tasks involving creativity; an incremental 
cost-reduction project is more measurable than complex and/or interrelated projects such 
as new product development.  I compare the difference in firm profit across various 
measurement regimes to evaluate the relative advantage of each regime.  In other words, I 
compute the relative value of performance measures to the firm, ceteris paribus. 
First, I develop a first-best effort benchmark for comparison with other regimes.  
Second, I consider regimes where various combinations of individual performance 
measures are contractible, but team output is not.  Third, I present the regime where only 
team output, x, is available for contracting.  Finally, I present the regime where a mix of 
team output and individual performance measures is available.  
2.4.1  Benchmark: First-Best effort  
In the first-best regime, the principal observes the level of individual effort and 
teamwork that each agent chooses and pays the agent a fixed wage that covers the agent’s 
effort cost, if (and only if) the agent has exerted the desired level of each type of effort.  
To determine the first-best level of effort, the principal maximizes the following: 
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j 
1/ 2E[ ] E[ ] E[ ] ( )i j i j i j ix w w e e s cτ τ− − = + + − − c  (3) 
To solve, substitute equation (1) into the above and take first order conditions 
with respect to efforts ei and τi, which yields: 
 ( )32 24,     for , 1, 2,  FB FB FBi i i j
j
e p i j i
s q
τ τ= = = j≠  
where the superscript FB refers to the first-best regime.  In the first-best regime, each 
agent’s individual effort is a simple increasing function of his task expertise.  Note that 
each agent’s choice of teamwork is an increasing, convex function of his teammate’s 
teamwork.  Solving for both agents simultaneously yields the optimal teamwork levels.  
Substituting the first-best effort levels into (3) yields firm profit.  In general, maximum 
profit in regime N is of the form:  
 1/ 21 ( ) (
2 2
N N N N N
i j i j
se e τ τΠ = + + )  (4) 
Firm profit consists of two terms: the arithmetic mean of individual effort, and the 
geometric mean of teamwork times half the synergy parameter.  The first-best effort 
levels and firm profit are as follows:  
 
( )
3 / 4 1/ 4
2 1/ 2
,    ,    for , 1, 2,    
2
1 = ( )    
2 4
FB FB
i i i i j
FB
i j i j
se p q q i j i
sp p q q
τ= = =
Π + +
j≠
 (5) 
Team composition plays a role in each agent’s optimal teamwork choice even in the first-
best regime: agent i’s teamwork increases not only in his own team expertise qi, but also 
in his teammate’s team expertise qj.  Firm profit is easily verified using equation (4) for 
the first-best regime.14  In this model, the first-best is not attainable due to risk-averse 
agents and imperfect precision. 
2.4.2  Individual performance measures contractible 
In this subsection I model the following regimes: (i) only the individual 
performance measure of individual effort, y, is available for contracting (regime Y), (ii) 
only the individual performance measure of teamwork, z, is available for contracting 
(regime Z), and (iii) both individual performance measures are available for contracting  
(regime YZ).  Regimes Y and Z are provided primarily for completeness and to facilitate 
determining the relative value to a firm of adding a performance measure.  In regimes Y 
and Z, I assume that only one of the individual measures is available for contracting and 
that the other individual measure and team output are prohibitively costly to obtain. 
2.4.2.1  Regime Y: Contracting only on a measure of individual effort  
Consider a regime where only performance measure y is contractible.  The 
principal offers each agent a wage of the form wi = αi + γi yi + δi yj.  Agent i’s problem is 
to maximize his certainty equivalent as follows:15 
2 2
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Taking first order conditions with respect to efforts ei and τi, and solving for the 
optimal effort levels yields eiY= pi γiY and τiY = 0.  In this regime, no teamwork is induced 
because the principal has no access to a performance measure sensitive to teamwork.  
Substituting the (PC), (IC) constraints into (2) yields the principal’s objective function: 
 
1,2
var
2
Y i
i i i i
i
rp cγ
=
⎛Π = − −⎜
⎝ ⎠
∑ w ⎞⎟
                                                
 (6) 
 
14 Straightforward algebra demonstrates that firm profit in the first-best regime strictly dominates firm 
profit in all other regimes analyzed (i.e., ΠFB > ΠN  for all Nœ{X, Y, Z, XY, YZ}).   
 16
15 Given a linear wage, the agent’s exponential utility function, and the normality assumptions on yi, the 
agent’s expected utility EUi can be written in terms of the agent’s certainty equivalent, as presented.   
To solve for the optimal incentive weights in regime Y, take first order conditions 
with respect to each incentive weight and solve.  Substituting these optimal incentive 
weights into equation (6) yields optimal firm profit for regime Y. 
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 (7) 
In this regime, the incentive weight offered to agent i on his performance measure 
is an increasing function of his task expertise pi.  It is also a simple decreasing function of 
his risk aversion and the precision of his personal performance measure, a standard result 
in LEN models.  The relative performance evaluation (i.e., incentive weight δiY) offered 
to each agent on his teammate’s performance measure is negative, which represents the 
filtering out of common variance from an agent’s compensation.  Note that when the 
team members’ individual performance measures are not correlated (i.e., ρy=0), there is 
no relative performance evaluation (i.e., δiY=0), another standard result in the literature. 
The resulting profit is a simple average of each agent’s individual effort.   
2.4.2.2  Regime Z: Contracting only on a measure of cooperative effort  
Next, consider a regime where only performance measure z is contractible.  The 
principal offers each agent a wage of the form wi = αi + κi zi + λi zj.  Agent i’s problem 
parallels the Y regime where only a measure of individual effort is available. Taking first 
order conditions of the agent’s certainty equivalent with respect to efforts ei and τi and 
solving for the optimal effort levels yields eiZ= 0 and τiZ = qi κiZ.16  In this regime, no 
                                                 
 17
16 There is no subgame problem in this or any regime modeled.  I.e., neither agent has a profitable 
deviation when his teammate chooses the equilibrium effort level.  Furthermore, although some of the 
regimes have multiple equilibria, there is only one equilibrium in each regime with positive effort levels: 
the other equilibria have zero, negative or complex effort levels. 
individual effort is induced because the principal has no access to an appropriately 
sensitive performance measure.  The principal maximizes: 
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To solve for the optimal incentive weights, take first order conditions with respect 
to each incentive weight and solve.  Substituting these optimal incentive weights into 
equation (8) yields optimal firm profit for regime Z, as summarized in Lemma 2.1. 
LEMMA 2.1.  In regime Z, the optimal incentive weights and firm profit are:17 
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In contrast to the Y regime, the incentive weight the principal offers to each agent 
in the Z regime is a function of both agents’ team expertise, risk aversion and individual 
measure precision.  This property has implications for a cross-functional team, which is 
generally comprised of team members from diverse departments, with potentially widely 
varying characteristics (especially measurement precision) due to the diversity of 
activities.  The model predicts that the optimal level of teamwork for each team member 
varies based on team composition.   
Comparing firm profit under the Y and Z regimes yields the following: 
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 (10) 
The ranking of the Y versus Z regimes depends on team composition, the level of 
synergy and the relative precision of the individual measures.18  Consider perfect 
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17 All proofs are in Appendix A. 
correlation of the teamwork measures: when ρz=1, the Z regime dominates the Y for 
sufficiently high synergy, and team expertise reinforces this dominance.19  When the 
measures of individual effort are perfectly correlated (i.e., ρy=1), expression (10) reduces 
to 24Y Z Z i jD s q qΠ > Π ⇔ > , and either regime may dominate.  In practice, one might 
expect a measure of teamwork to be inherently less precise than a measure of individual 
effort because measuring teamwork may involve more subjectivity.  Even if this is so, the 
above analysis shows that Z may still dominate Y when synergy, team expertise and/or 
the correlation between the agents’ teamwork measures are sufficiently high.  
2.4.2.3  Regime YZ: Contracting on both individual measures  
In this regime, performance measures y and z are contractible.  The principal 
offers each agent a wage of the form wi = αi + γi yi + δi yj + κi zi + λi zj.  Agent i’s 
problem parallels the Y and Z regimes. Taking first order conditions of the agent’s 
certainty equivalent with respect to efforts ei and τi and solving for the optimal effort 
levels yields eiYZ = pi γiYZ and τiYZ = qi κiYZ.  The principal’s problem also parallels the Y 
and Z regimes.  Solving for the optimal incentive weights and firm profit gives Lemma 
2.2. 
LEMMA 2.2.  In regime YZ, the optimal effort levels, incentive weights, and firm 
profit are as follows: 
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i i i i i i i
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e p qγ τ κ
iγ γ δ δ κ κ λ λ
= =
= = = =
Π = Π + Π
 (11) 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 The combination of synergy and performance measure precision can be interpreted as the measure’s 
“line-of-sight”, or the extent to which effort is a relatively small or large component of a performance 
measure.  For example, when Rockwell Automation initially developed its CSMIP (Critical Success 
Measures Incentive Plan), it found that employees perceived some performance measures, such as 
worldwide inventory days, as being too far beyond their ability to control locally.  Rockwell then adjusted 
its plan to create subsets of those measures for CSMIP, or smaller pieces of those measures that drive the 
longer line-of-sight measures, for the different business units (Parker et al. [2000: 119]). 
 19
19 In fact, s>2 is sufficient because each term within the parentheses is less than one. 
From equation (11), it is clear that the YZ regime strictly dominates each of the Y 
and Z regimes.  As expected, the ability to induce both types of effort improves the firm’s 
expected profit. 
2.4.3  Regime X: Team output contractible 
In this regime, I assume the principal can contract on team output, but individual 
performance measures of individual effort and teamwork are prohibitively costly to 
obtain.20  The principal offers each agent a wage of the form wi = αi + βi x.  Agent i’s 
problem is to maximize his certainty equivalent as follows: 
( )1/ 2 2 2 2 2
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Taking first order conditions with respect to efforts ei and τi and solving for the 
optimal effort levels yields the following: 
 3 / 4 1/ 4,   ( ) ( )      for , 1, 2,  
2
X X X X X
i i i i i i j j
se p q q i j iβ τ β β= = = j≠  (12) 
In the X regime, each team member internalizes the synergy generated together 
with his teammate, and adjusts his teamwork level accordingly.  Agent i’s teamwork 
increases in agent j’s explicit incentive weight βj and team expertise qj.  This interplay 
suggests the incentive weights of one’s teammates can serve as a coordination device for 
setting appropriate effort levels for all team members.  This is consistent with policies 
found in practice to aggressively publicize incentive plans within a firm (Parker et al. 
[2000: 193, 201]). 
Given the solutions to the agents’ problem, the principal maximizes: 
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 20
20 Aside from the direct expense of data collection and processing associated with individual performance 
measures, a firm may also face substantial indirect costs.  Auriol et al. [2002] find that the use of individual 
performance measures creates an implicit incentive for a team member to sabotage his teammates to obtain 
a higher relative assessment of his own skill by the labor market. 
Taking first order conditions with respect to β1 and β2 yields the following:21 
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Solving simultaneously for β1 and β2 is not tractable.  However, using the implicit 
function theorem, one can show that β1 is a function of β2 and vice versa.  Furthermore, 
∂βi/∂βj takes a positive (negative) value when synergy is high (low) relative to the 
variance of team output.  Because agent i’s individual effort is a multiple of his incentive 
weight, which is in turn a function of agent j’s incentive weight (i.e., eiX = pi βiX(βjX)), one 
agent’s individual, non-collaborative effort may either be increasing or decreasing in his 
teammate’s incentive weight. This potentially negative impact on agent j’s individual 
effort happens because both team members’ teamwork responds to both incentive 
weights β1 and β2.  This spillover effect of agent i’s incentive weight on agent j causes 
the principal to reduce incentive weight βi relative to no spillover (she gets more 
teamwork value for her money).  The principal’s reduction of incentive weight βi causes 
a corresponding reduction in individual effort (since eiX = pi βiX).   
To simplify the expressions, I impose symmetry across all agent characteristics.  
To identical agents, the principal offers identical incentive weights (i.e., 
β1=β2=β).  Solving (14) then gives the optimal incentive weights.  Substituting these 
weights into the principal’s objective function yields Lemma 2.3. 
LEMMA 2.3.  With identical agents, the optimal incentive weights and firm profit 
in regime X are as follows: 
 
2 2
2 2 2
4 ( 4,   
4( ) 4( 4( ))
X X
i
x x
s q p s q p
s q p r s q p r
β
σ σ
+
= Π =
+ + + +
2
2
)+
                                                
 (15) 
 
 21
21 Second order conditions verify that this is a maximum. 
Firm profit in regime X increases at an increasing rate in the square of the synergy 
parameter (s2).  This is contrasts with the input regimes, where firm profit increases at a 
constant rate in s2 (Z and YZ) or not at all (Y). 
Comparison of the X and Y regimes yields:22   
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As expected, the X regime generally dominates the Y regime when team output is 
sufficiently precise (i.e., σx2 low), the synergy parameter s is sufficiently high or the team 
expertise q is sufficiently high, because firm profit in regime Y is unaffected by these 
three parameters.  Precision in measure y (net of correlation) favors Y over X. 
Next, consider the X versus Z regimes.  If the principal can implement only one 
performance measure and (at least some) teamwork is critical, with which of these 
regimes is she better off?  Ex ante, it is not clear whether one regime will consistently 
outperform the other.  Both regimes successfully induce teamwork; the X regime relies on 
an output measure, whereas the Z regime uses an input measure.  Team members directly 
internalize the synergy in the X regime via team output (measure x).  In contrast, the 
principal induces the interdependency between agents via incentive weights in the Z 
regime.   
Comparing the firm profit under the X and Z regimes yields: 
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Clearly, whenever one measure is more precise than the other, the associated 
regime is more likely to dominate.  When synergy is sufficiently low (e.g., ), the X 
regime dominates because it also contains an individual effort component.  As synergy 
0s →
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22 To facilitate comparison across regimes, the Y and Z regimes are stated here with identical agents. 
(i.e., the sensitivity of team output, x, to teamwork) increases, the X regime eventually 
dominates because profit increases at an increasing rate in s2, versus increasing at a 
constant rate in s2 in the Z regime.  As a result, when synergy is sufficiently high (e.g., 
), the X regime dominates.  However, for intermediate values of synergy, firm 
profit in regime Z can increase faster in synergy than does firm profit in regime X , which 
in turn increases faster in synergy than does regime Y (i.e., ∂ΠZ/∂s > ∂ΠX/∂s > ∂ΠY/∂s=0).   
s → ∞
Not surprisingly, task expertise favors the dominance of regime X over Z because 
only regime X benefits from more efficiency in individual effort.  It is less obvious which 
regime would benefit more from an increase in team expertise q.  Note that as q 
increases, the left-hand side of (16) decreases.  More generally, taking the derivative of 
the difference between firm profit in regimes X and Z with respect to q yields: 
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This parsimonious expression shows the interplay between synergy, precision and 
team composition in determining which regime sees firm profit increase faster in team 
expertise.  Ceteris paribus, when team composition determines the direction of the 
inequality, an increase in team expertise benefits a task-focused team (i.e., relatively 
more task expertise) more in the X regime, whereas a team-focused team benefits more in 
the Z regime.  These points are summarized in Proposition 2.1. 
PROPOSITION 2.1.  With identical agents, the relative ranking of firm profit in the 
team output-based X regime versus the teamwork input-based Z regime is as follows: 
1. If synergy is sufficiently high or low, firm profit is higher in the X regime. 
2. For intermediate synergy, either regime can dominate.   
 23
3. Increases in task expertise p favor the X regime (i.e., increases in p benefit 
regime X more than regime Z).   
4. Increases in team expertise q favor regime X (regime Z) when the 
expression 
2
2
24
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z
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σ
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 is positive (negative). 
Proposition 2.1 demonstrates that determining whether a noisy measure of team 
output or teamwork input is more valuable to the firm depends not only on the precision 
of the measures, but also on team composition (i.e., team versus task expertise) and the 
degree of synergy.  Thus, in some situations, either of the contradictory recommendations 
by Lawford [2003] (don’t reward on individual measures) and Parker et al. [2000] (do 
reward on individual measures) can be in the firm’s best interest.   
Finally, compare the X and YZ regimes: 
2 2 2 2
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Note that whenever the Z regime dominates the X regime, the YZ regime also 
dominates X.  Some refinements from adding measure y include: (1) if 
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then team expertise q favors regime X over YZ, and (2) if 
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, then the 
synergy s favors regime X over YZ. 23   
2.4.4  Regime XY: Mix of team and individual performance measures contractible 
Given the ambiguous dominance of stand alone team versus individual 
performance measures, I next look at a mix of these two measures.  In this regime, I 
assume the principal has both team output and one type of individual performance 
measure available for contracting purposes.  For tractability, assume that the measure of 
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23 These are both sufficient but not necessary conditions.  See Appendix A for the necessary and sufficient 
conditions. 
individual effort is available for contracting but that a measure of teamwork is 
prohibitively costly to obtain.  The principal offers each agent a wage of the form wi = αi 
+ βi x + γi yi + δi yj.  Agent i’s problem is to maximize his certainty equivalent as follows: 
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Taking first order conditions with respect to efforts ei and τi and solving for the 
optimal effort levels yields the following: 
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Given the solutions to the agents’ problem, the principal maximizes: 
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First order conditions with respect to βi, γi and δi are therefore: 
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Solving for γi and δi is straightforward.  However, as in the X regime, solving 
simultaneously for βi and βj is not tractable.  To obtain solutions in closed form, I again 
impose symmetry across agents.  To identical agents, the principal offers identical 
incentive weights (i.e., βi=βj=β).  Solving (19) with these values yields the optimal 
incentive weights and firm profit, as shown in Lemma 2.4. 
LEMMA 2.4. With identical agents, the optimal incentive weights and firm profit 
in regime XY are as follows: 
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As expected, XY dominates the X and Y regimes.  Next, consider the difference 
between the XY and YZ regimes.   
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 (21) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that whether a firm is better off with a blend of performance 
measures (regime XY) or with individual measures alone (regime YZ) depends in part on 
the relative net precisions of team output and the measure of teamwork.  
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Figure 2.1. Firm profit across regimes as a function of σx and Σy (p=q=r=1, s=2, 
Σy2=σx2, Σz2=1) and as a function of Σz  (p=q=r=1, s=2, Σy2=3/4, σx2 =1). 
However, Figure 2.1 does not tell the whole story.  Figure 2.2 shows that team 
composition also helps determine which regime dominates.      
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Figure 2.2. Firm profit as a function of task expertise p (q=1,r=1, s=2, σx2 =5, Σy2=Σz2=1) 
and as a function of team expertise q (p=2,r=1, s=2, σx2 =5, Σy2=Σz2=1). 
In both regimes XY and YZ, firm profit increases in task/team expertise, the net 
precision of measure y (i.e., Σy-2) and in synergy parameter s.  Ceteris paribus, either 
regime may dominate when synergy is low (e.g., ): expression (21) reduces to 0s →
XY YZΠ > Π ⇔ 2(2 1)Y xp D rσ− > .  When synergy is sufficiently high (i.e., the s
4 term on 
the left-hand side of (21) dominates), the XY regime is favored.  Intermediate values of 
synergy and the precision of the measure y are interrelated and ambiguous in the ranking 
of the XY and YZ regimes.   
PROPOSITION 2.2.  With identical agents, the relative ranking of firm profit in the 
blend of team and individual measures regime, XY, versus the individual measures only 
regime, YZ, is as follows: 
1. If synergy is sufficiently high, firm profit is higher in the XY regime. 
2. If synergy is sufficiently low, either regime may have higher profit. Which 
regime dominates depends on task expertise and the net precision of 
measures x and y. 
3. There exist conditions under which the firm profit is higher under regime 
YZ than XY. 
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These results are generally consistent with some of the main takeaways of Parker 
et al. [2000], an empirical study of team incentive contracts found in practice. First, 
customize the incentive plan to the organization in question.  Second, align the incentive 
plan with business objectives by choosing the right performance measures: the key to 
success is through teamwork.   
2.5.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduces interdependencies between team members, i.e., team 
synergy, and addresses two research questions.  First, for an exogenously given set of 
performance measures, how can a firm best induce teamwork and reap the benefits of 
synergy using linear incentive contracts?  Second, if a firm can afford only one (or only 
one type of) performance measure, with which measure is the firm better off? 
This analysis seeks to reconcile contradictory guidance to firms who seek to 
design an incentive plan to induce teamwork and achieve synergy.  Lawford [2003] 
recommends that firms not single out individual team members for special 
acknowledgement, to prevent competitiveness that can damage a collaborative 
environment.  On the other hand, Parker et al. [2000] advise that firms do reward 
individual performance.  I find that, given the availability of a single performance 
measure, either of these approaches may dominate the other.  This analysis therefore may 
have practical implications for a firm’s choice of performance measures when potential 
team synergy is present. 
This chapter examines one specific form of team synergy.  I assume that team 
members choose two different types of effort, individual effort and teamwork.  Synergy 
is an increasing and concave multiplicative function of teamwork.  Individual 
performance measures do not capture this synergy.  I vary the availability of team and 
individual performance measures and ascertain the impact on optimal linear incentive 
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weights that induce individual effort and teamwork to achieve synergy.  I find that when 
team members influence each other’s marginal productivity via teamwork, each agent’s 
teamwork choice depends not only on his own incentive weights and team expertise, but 
also on the incentive weights and team expertise of his teammate.  Further, I find that 
firm profit can be higher in either a team-output-based or a teamwork-input-based 
contracting regime.  An increase in team expertise may benefit a firm with a task-focused 
team (i.e., relatively more task expertise than team expertise) more in a team-output-
based contracting regime, whereas a firm with a team-focused team may benefit more in 
a teamwork-input-based contracting regime.  Finally, firm profit can be higher when 
contracting only on two types of input-based individual performance measures than when 
contracting on a blend of team output and one type of input measure.  The most valuable 
performance measure(s) to the firm for contracting purposes depends not only on the 
precision of the measures, but also on team composition and the degree of synergy.   
Additional modeling choices inherent in the LEN structure limit the 
generalizability of the results.  Most notably, the exogenous assumption of linear wage 
contracts, while consistent with prior literature, precludes the consideration of optimal 
contracts.  In addition, I assume constant absolute risk aversion (negative exponential 
utility function) of both agents and normally distributed error terms.  For simplicity, I 
assume no correlation between error terms of different types of performance measures.  
These assumptions provide the necessary tractability for modeling complex constructs 
such as teamwork and synergy. 
 
 30
                                                
Chapter 3: Differential Career Concerns and Team Synergy 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Career concerns arise when an agent expends incremental effort in an attempt to 
influence the labor market’s assessment of his ability, thus increasing his future wages.  
Analytic models predict, and empirical evidence supports, that junior workers have 
greater career concerns than those near the end of their careers.24  That is, differential 
career concerns induce different levels of effort across worker types. 
Team synergy occurs when the total output of a team, working collaboratively, 
exceeds the sum of the output of the team members working individually.  Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation finds that in a synergistic environment, the level of teamwork each agent 
chooses depends not only on his own characteristics, but also on his teammates’ 
characteristics.  These results suggest that differential career concerns among team 
members may also influence the decision of how much teamwork to perform. 
This chapter examines how these two forces affecting effort – differential career 
concerns and team synergy – interact in environments where different performance 
measures are observed.  Specifically, I explore the impact on a team member’s non-
collaborative and collaborative effort choices and on the resulting firm profit of (i) the 
relative importance of synergy, (ii) a team member’s own career concerns, (ii) his 
teammate’s career concerns, (iii) the interaction between the career concerns of different 
team members, and (iv) the interaction between synergy and career concerns.  For 
example, what impact does the relative lack of career concerns of a senior team member 
 
24 Gibbons and Murphy [1992] analytically develop and empirically test a prediction that junior workers 
have greater career concerns, and hence receive less explicit incentives, than those near the end of their 
careers.  Kaarboe and Olsen [2004] model a multi-task environment where junior workers have greater 
career concerns (which potentially conflict with the principal’s interests), and hence they may receive more 
explicit incentives, than senior workers. 
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have on his own effort choices, on his teammate’s effort choices, and ultimately on 
profit?  When is a firm better off with a team of all junior, all senior, or a mix of agent 
types?  The results of this chapter may help explain why teams of junior or senior people 
are in more demand in some environments than in others. 
These questions are important to firms and researchers alike because teams – 
comprised of individuals with varying career concerns – have become omnipresent in the 
workplace, with a correspondingly large economic impact on firms.  Presumably the 
purpose of these teams is to achieve synergy: if not, no team is needed.  This research is 
especially timely due to the upcoming shift in seniority in the work force as an expected 
wave of retirements begins in the next few years.25  In its 2005 survey of human 
resources executives, Deloitte Consulting found that more than 60 percent of the 123 
respondents said baby boomer retirement poses the greatest threat to business 
performance over the next three years.  This study examines one aspect of the upcoming 
change in workforce composition and its associated implications for team synergy, which 
is expected to have a major economic impact on firms. 
To address the research questions, I employ a two-period model of a firm that 
hires two agents to work together on a team.26  I vary the type of performance measure 
available to the firm: (1) an output measure that includes a synergy component, (2) a pair 
of individual input measures with no such synergy component, or (3) both input and 
output measures. Further, I assume that the agents who comprise the team have varying 
degrees of career concerns.  To focus the analysis on career concerns, I assume that the 
 
25 The first wave of baby boomers turns 62 in three years, the average retirement age in North America, 
Europe and Asia. According to the Deloitte survey "It's 2008: Do You Know Where Your Talent Is? Why 
Acquisition and Retention Strategies Don't Work," one-third of U.S. companies expect to lose 11 percent or 
more of their current workforce to retirements by 2008. 
26 Given the difficulty of directly observing either career concerns or synergy in practice, an analytic model 
is an appropriate tool to identify and analyze these effects, generating testable empirical predictions. 
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second period measures have no effort component; this assumption eliminates ratchet 
effects from the analysis and allows more parsimonious solutions.   
I model a short-term contracting environment where the performance measures 
are observable but exogenously non-contractible.27 This assumption not only increases 
tractability, but it also isolates career concerns as the sole motivator of individual effort 
and teamwork, permitting an exclusive focus on analyzing the interaction between 
differential career concerns and team synergy. 
For simplicity, the principal hires the team to perform a one-period task, and 
accordingly all contracts are for one period only (i.e., mandatory rotation).  This 
assumption removes the firing decision and the potential for an adverse selection problem 
in the labor market while preserving career concerns.  Examples of one-period team 
employment with career concerns include startup/ transitional/ turnaround specialist 
executive teams who are hired only for the duration of a certain firm life-cycle phase, or 
one-time consulting and other professional team engagements; the outcomes of these 
engagements have a direct impact on future compensation. 
The results indicate that, ceteris paribus, firms prefer more synergy to less.  A 
firm whose team is comprised of agents of equal seniority is strictly better off with junior 
team members (i.e., workers with higher career concerns), and synergy strengthens the 
positive effect of career concerns.  Intuitively, this happens because, in the absence of 
explicit incentives, career concerns are required to induce any effort at all, and synergy is 
required to produce positive collaborative effort.  However, for heterogeneous teams, 
 
27 In chapter 4, I model the same regimes with contractible performance measures.  However, the 
assumption of non-contractible performance measures is not uncommon in the career-related literature 
(e.g.,Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa [1986], Jeon [1996], Dewatripont, Jewittt, & Tirole [1999], Berck and 
Lipow [2000] and Hoffler and Sliwka [2003]).  When all performance measures are contractible, prior 
research suggests that firms modify the explicit incentives to undo part or all of the impact of implicit 
incentives (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy [1992], Autrey, Dikolli, & Newman [2005], Kaarboe and Olsen 
[2004]). 
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stronger career concerns are not necessarily better: the interaction between agents’ career 
concerns can have either a beneficial or adverse impact on firm profit.  The results 
indicate that the impact on firm profit depends on the level of synergy, the precision of 
performance measures and the degree of team heterogeneity.    
This chapter builds on a small analytic literature of teams and career concerns.28  
However, there are few multiple-agent and/or multiple-task career concerns models.  
Two such single-action, multiple-agent models are Meyer and Vickers [1997] and Jeon 
[1996].  Meyer and Vickers [1997] analyze a quasi-two-agent model in which firms 
separately maximize across each agent’s individual and contractible output (net of 
wages), rather than maximizing collective team output.  There is no team aspect; the 
purpose of multiple agents is to provide relative performance information only.  The 
authors explore the interaction between relative performance evaluation and implicit 
incentives.  Jeon [1996] models a two-agent team in which the only observable measure 
is a non-contractible aggregate team output measure.  Output is additively separable in 
the agents’ effort level, ability and a shock term; there is no synergy component.  He 
finds that a team comprised of a mix of older and younger workers is more efficient than 
a team from a single generation.  
Turning to the multiple-task, single-agent research stream, two such papers are 
Dewatripont et al. [1999] and Kaarboe and Olsen [2004].  Dewatripont et al. [1999] 
study the impact of information structures on career concerns in a generalized non-
contractible setting. They find that improved information may increase or decrease 
incentives.  Kaarboe and Olsen [2004] model a single agent whose complementary tasks 
 
28 The larger career concerns literature is consists primarily of single-agent, single-action models, 
including:  Carrillo [2003], Hoffler and Sliwka [2003], Tadelis [2002], Andersson [2002], Zabojnik [2001], 
Berck and Lipow [2000], Nagar [1999], Jeon [1998], Farber and Gibbons [1996], Nagarajan, 
Sivaramakrishnan and Sridhar [1995], Senbongi and Harrington [1995],  Sridhar [1994], Bernhardt and 
Scoones [1993],and Gibbons and Murphy [1992].  Earlier career concerns work is surveyed by Borland 
[1992]. 
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produce a synergy-like component in output, and a principal who has more information 
about the agent’s type than the labor market. In contrast to prior career concerns 
literature, in which firms reduce explicit incentives for career concerns, they find explicit 
and implicit incentives can be complements. Thus, a junior worker (i.e., higher career 
concerns) might receive more explicit incentives than a senior worker. 
One paper, Auriol et al. [2002], models a multiple-agent, multiple action setting.  
In their model, an individual, contractible performance measure is observed for each of 
two team members.  Each individual measure is an additive function of an agent’s own 
individual effort and his teammate’s teamwork, but, as team output is simply the sum of 
the individual performance measures, there is no synergy in the model.  Auriol et al. 
[2002] find that the agent’s implicit incentives are strictly negative – each agent has a 
“sabotage” incentive because for a given realization of team output in period 1, a higher 
realization of one’s teammate’s period 2 individual performance means a correspondingly 
lower expectation of the agent’s own ability.   
None of these models, however, includes an interactive team synergy component.  
One such model is presented in chapter 2: a single-period model in which two agents 
each choose two types of effort, collaborative effort and non-collaborative effort.  The 
team output of agents who choose to collaborate with each other exceeds the output when 
agents do not work together. This extra output, or “synergy,” is produced by an 
interactive term: each agent’s teamwork increases their teammate’s marginal 
productivity.   
This chapter bridges all three research streams.  I combine the interactive synergy 
term from chapter 2 with the team career concerns model in Auriol et al. [2002] and the  
team generational composition from Jeon [1996], modeled as differential career concerns. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 introduces the model.  
Section 3.3 discusses the results in each performance measurement regime.  Section 3.4 
discusses limitations and concludes. 
3.2. THE MODEL 
Consider a two-period model where each period a risk-neutral principal hires two 
risk- and effort-averse agents for a one-period task.  Each agent has ability ai, which is 
constant across periods and firms.29  In the first period, agent i (i=1,2) chooses individual 
non-negative effort, ei, and teamwork, τi.  In period 1, team output x1 is a linearly additive 
function of agent abilities a1 and a2, individual efforts e1 and e2, a team synergy term, 
s(τ1τ2)1/2, and a transient shock, εx1.  In period 2, team output consists only of ability and 
a transient shock, as follows:30 
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where s>0 is an exogenous parameter known to all parties that represents the strength of 
the synergy. The individual performance measures, if they exist, are linearly additive 
functions of ability ai, individual effort ei, and teamwork τi and a transient shock, εyit, as 
follows: 
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This functional form reflects that disentangling the agent’s individual effort from 
his teamwork may not be possible.  For example, billable hours may reflect a 
combination of time spent in individual effort and helping one’s teammates.  When this is 
the case, only an aggregate measure of the two types of effort is observable, and the 
parameter fii∈[0,1] represents the weight of agent i’s teamwork (relative to his individual 
                                                 
2i
29 To avoid confusion, the index i always refers to which agent, and the index t indicates which period. 
30 Period 2 team output could be 2i i xx a ε= + ; that is, the team need not exist in period 2.  
effort) on his own measure.  Further, a team member’s individual performance measure 
may increase when his teammate assists him.  The parameter fij∈[0,1] represents the 
weight of agent j’s teamwork (relative to agent i’s individual effort) on agent i’s 
individual performance measure.31 
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For simplicity, let the agents’ abilities be independent of each other and of all 
transient shocks; likewise, let all shock terms be independent. The random variables are 
normally distributed as follows: 
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The variable µi represents the ex ante expected value of agent i’s ability.  The 
variable ki represents the amount of variance in team output that relates to ability and can 
be interpreted as agent i’s degree of career concerns: higher values of ki represent more 
diffuse priors about the agent’s ability.  The variables m and n, respectively, represent the 
performance measure variance related to the transient shock in the team output and 
individual performance measures. 
Each agent’s cost of effort is a twice-differentiable convex increasing function of 
individual effort and teamwork.  For simplicity, assume the costs of each type of effort 
are additively separable. In period 2, there is no effort and accordingly no effort cost. In 
period 1, total cost of effort ci has the functional form: 
 2 21 1 ,    for 1, 2
2 2i i i
c e iτ= + =   
                                                 
31 I restrict the upper bound on fii and fij to ensure positive expected firm profit in all regimes (specifically, 
in the regime where only individual measures are observable).  It seems intuitive that one or both of the fii 
and fij parameters will be zero in certain cases.  For generality, I include both parameters whenever 
tractable.  
Each agent has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function: 
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where ri œ (0,¶) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for agent i 
and p1N consists of the observable period 1 performance measures in regime N.32 
Because there is no incentive pay (due to non-contractible measures), the 
principal can only offer the agents a fixed wage wit (i,t=1,2), which must meet or exceed 
the agent’s outside opportunities to induce the agent to accept the principal’s offer. 
All parties – the principal and all labor market firms – have access to all 
observable period 1 performance measures.  Conditional on observing these realizations, 
the principal and labor market update their priors about each agent’s ability.  The labor 
market is perfectly competitive and sets each agent’s reservation utility as follows: 
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3.3. ANALYSIS 
All regimes are solved by backward induction: the period 2 problem is solved 
first, and then the period 1 problem is solved given the period 2 solutions.  The agent 
makes no choices in period 2.  The period 2 principal is risk neutral and maximizes 
expected profit: 
1,22
2 2 1 12 1 22 1, 
2 1 2 1
Max  [ | ] [ | ] [ | ]
   subject to     (PC)   [ | ] ( ),  1, 2 
ii
N N
N N
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α =
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To obtain the services of the agents, the principal must offer each agent at least 
the utility he could obtain in the labor market in period 2 (conditional on period 1 
observed realizations), represented by the participation constraint (PC). 
 
32 Regime Nœ{X, Y, XY} refers to the regime where only performance measures x or y or both, 
respectively, are observable to the principal and the labor market.  
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In period 2, the principal precisely meets each agent’s participation constraint, 
so . Thus, the offered wage equals the reservation wage, which by  
(23) equals the agent’s revised expected ability: 
2 1 2 1[ | ] (
N
i iE w p U p=
  (24) 2 2 1 1( ) [ | ],      1, 2
N N N N
i i iU p E a p iα = ≡ =
In period 1, each agent chooses individual effort and teamwork to maximize his 
expected utility, taking into account the effect of this effort on the period 2 wage.  Each 
agent’s period 1 wage is simply the ex ante expectation about his ability, µi: 
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Substituting αi2N from (24) into agent i’s expected utility from (22) and rewriting 
utility in the certainty equivalent form yields:33 
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The period 1 principal is also risk-neutral and maximizes expected profit: 
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In period 1, each agent’s action must maximize his utility, represented by the 
incentive compatibility constraint (IC).  Note that each agent’s participation constraint 
maximizes cumulative period 1 and period 2 utility, whereas the period 1 principal only 
compensates the agent for period 1.  However, the period 2 principal’s solution is 
anticipated by all parties, and so each agent’s (binding) participation constraint can be 
rewritten as follows: 
 1 1 22 ( / 2) var( ) ,   i i i i i iEw c r w w i2 1, 2µ α= + + + − =  (27) 
                                                 
33 The agent’s utility can be expressed in this mean-variance form due to the LEN assumptions: a Linear 
wage, Negative Exponential agent utility and Normally distributed performance measures. 
Ex ante, the labor market’s belief about the agent’s ability is the same for period 1 
and period 2, (i.e. Ui1N = EUi2N = µi). Thus, when no measures are contractible (i.e., 
wi1=αi1), the updating of beliefs incorporated in the period 2 fixed wage provides the only 
source of compensation to the agent influenced by period 1 effort.  The period 1 
principal’s problem can be rewritten as: 
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3.3.1 Team output measure observable (Regime X) 
In this regime, period 1 team output is observable but not contractible, and no 
individual performance measures exist.  All parties update their beliefs about the agent’s 
type based on the observed period 1 team output, x1, and the period 2 fixed wage, αi2, is 
adjusted accordingly: 
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where 1̂x  is the expected value of x1 given the principal’s and labor market’s conjectures 
about the agents’ effort choices, ˆ and ie îτ  (i.e., ). To 
solve for each agent’s period 1 effort choices, substitute (29) into (26), take first order 
conditions and solve, which yields Lemma 3.1. 
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LEMMA 3.1.  When non-contractible team output x is the only observable 
performance measure, individual (non-collaborative) effort and teamwork (collaborative 
effort) are as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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PROOF: All proofs are in Appendix B.34 
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34 There is no subgame problem in this or any regime modeled.  That is, neither agent has a profitable 
deviation when his teammate chooses the equilibrium effort level.  Furthermore, although some of the 
regimes have multiple equilibria, there is only one equilibrium in each regime with positive effort levels: 
the other equilibria have zero, negative or complex effort levels. 
Even in the absence of explicit incentives, each agent’s career concerns induce 
positive levels of both individual effort and teamwork (for s>0).  As expected, individual 
effort is not a function of the synergy parameter.   Further, it is straightforward from (30) 
that agent i’s individual effort increases in his own career concerns ki and decreases in his 
teammate’s career concerns kj.35  However, an increase in agent j’s career concerns may 
either increase or decrease the direct career effect (i.e., the marginal impact of a change in 
agent i’s career concerns on agent i’s individual effort) for i,j=1,2, i≠j: 
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Thus, a more senior agent (ki < kj ) has his career effect dampened by increases in 
his junior partner’s career concerns, and a sufficiently junior agent (ki > kj+m) has his 
career effect enhanced by increases in his senior partner’s career concerns.  When agents 
have equal seniority (ki = kj), individual effort increases in k at a decreasing rate.36   
Each agent’s teamwork level incorporates not only his own career concerns (a 
“direct” career effect), but also those of his teammate (an “indirect” career effect), due to 
the interdependent synergy term in team output.  In this regime, teamwork increases at a 
constant rate in the synergy parameter. 
The interdependency between agents produces a more complicated relationship 
between teamwork and each agent’s degree of career concerns.  Agent i’s teamwork is 
affected by changes in career concerns as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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35 This decrease is in essence free-riding on his teammate’s career concerns, and it occurs because the 
individual efforts of each agent are substitutes.  Note that the teamwork choices are complements, so free-
riding per se does not occur. 
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36 One example of a team with agents at the same career level (a “peer-to-peer” team) is a cross-functional 
team, such as an executive team. 
First, consider the direct career effect, 
ik
∂
∂
, on agent i’s teamwork Xiτ . Agent i’s  
teamwork choice increases in his own career concerns if and only if he is sufficiently 
senior (ki<3(kj+m)).  Equivalently, with a sufficiently imprecise team output measure 
(m>(ki /3)–kj), all agents choose less teamwork as their own career concerns increase, 
because the imprecision reduces the impact of any incremental teamwork. 
A senior agent’s (ki<kj) teamwork increases in his own career concerns (i.e., 
increases as he becomes less senior), whereas a junior agent’s (ki=3(kj+m)) teamwork 
decreases in his career concerns.  This counterintuitive negative direct career effect 
happens because of countervailing career effects and the interdependency between 
agents.  Note that one agent’s teamwork is a function of both team members’ individual 
effort (specifically, τi=(s/2)ei3/4ej1/4).  Recall that each agent’s individual effort increases 
in his own (direct) career concerns and decreases in the (indirect) career concerns of his 
teammate. The negative indirect career effect dominates for a junior person whereas the 
positive direct career effect dominates for a senior person.37   
Second, consider the indirect career effect on teamwork, 
X
i
jk
τ∂
∂
. Agent i’s 
teamwork choice increases in his teammate’s career concerns if and only if his teammate 
is sufficiently senior (kj<(ki+m)/3). Hence, a sufficiently junior team member (ki>3kj –m) 
responds positively to his more senior teammate’s career concerns.  Or, alternatively 
stated, with a sufficiently imprecise team output measure (m>ki+3kj), all agents choose 
more teamwork as their teammate’s career concerns increase.  The intuition parallels the 
direct career effect above. 
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37 To see this, consider the product rule: 
1/ 4 3 / 4
1/ 4 3 / 4
3
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e A e A
+
′ ′= + ⇒ −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, where 
A=(k1+k2+m)2. 
Next, consider the cross-partial effects for teamwork. Note that both 
X
i
ik
τ∂
∂
 and 
X
i
jk
τ∂
∂
 increase or decrease at a constant rate in synergy, so synergy reinforces the 
marginal impact of career concerns (whatever they may be) on teamwork.  The marginal 
impact of each agent’s career concerns on his teammate’s direct career effect is as 
follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 
( )22
1/ 4 3 / 4 3
1 2
3(3 )( ) 2 (11 )
32 ( )
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i j j i ji
i j i j
k k m k m k k ms
k k k k k k m
τ + − + − +∂
= −
∂ ∂ + +
 
For a sufficiently junior agent (ki>3kj), increases in his teammate’s career 
concerns lessen his direct career effect.  A junior agent chooses a lower level of 
teamwork as his own career concerns increase and a higher level of teamwork as his 
teammate’s career concerns increase.  Taken together, these marginal effects overlap as a 
result of the interdependency.  For a given level of precision, the reverse is true for a 
sufficiently senior agent (ki<m<2kj).  For peers (ki=kj), teamwork increases in the 
common degree of career concerns k at a decreasing rate.  
The period 1 principal’s expected profit in the X regime is as follows: 
 
[ ]2 1/ 22 2 1 2 1 21 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 2
1 2 1 2
2
1 2
( ) 3( ) 4(1 ) (1 ) 4 2 ( )
2( ) 8( )
where ( )
X X X
X
s k k k k mk R k R k k m k k
k k m k k m
R r k k mσ
+ +− + − + + +
Π = +
+ + + +
≡ + +
 (31) 
It is clear from the above expression that expected firm profit increases at an 
increasing rate in the synergy parameter for all agent types and levels of precision.  Note 
that although there are no explicit incentives because the performance measures are not 
contractible, the agent still bears some risk from the implicit incentives.  From (31), if the 
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risk premium RX is too high, profit becomes negative and the principal prefers to shut 
down.  To guarantee that expected period 1 profit is positive, assume RX <1.38   
The effect of agent i’s career concerns on profit is as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 
( )2 2 2
1
3
1 2
2 1/ 2 2 2
1/ 2 3
1 2
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Thus, if agent i is more senior than his teammate (ki<kj), profit increases in agent 
i’s career concerns.  However, for a given level of precision, profit decreases in the career 
concerns of a sufficiently junior agent, as demonstrated in Figure 3.1.39  This decrease 
happens because teamwork decreases in the career concerns of a junior agent, which in 
turn lowers expected profit. 
 
 
38 The assumption that RX <1limits the generalizability of the results to settings with either mildly risk 
averse agents or performance measures with low variance.  The desirability of a low variance setting is one 
of the key takeaways of Parker et al. [2000], who found that incentive plans based on performance 
measures considered too noisy by team members were not particularly effective.  As a result, the study 
recommends that, for best results, firms invest in providing reasonably low variance measures. 
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39 The shape of the curve in Figure 3.1 implies the existence of an optimal level of career concerns.   For 
k1≠k2 , however, the second order condition can be positive or negative, which implies that this critical 
point need not be a maximum.  For k1=k2 , firm profit strictly increases in career concerns, so there is no 
corresponding downturn as depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Expected firm profit in the X regime as a function of ki. (m=1, r=.5, σ2=.25, 
s=4, kj=1) 
Next, consider the impact of one agent’s career concerns on his teammate’s direct 
career effect on expected profit.  This expression is given by: 
 
2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
4 4
1 2 1 2 1 2
22 32 2
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 (32) 
Note that this expression decreases in team heterogeneity, .  For a 
sufficiently junior (k1k2>m2) and homogeneous team (k1→k2), increases in one 
teammate’s career concerns enhance the other’s direct career effect on expected profit. 
However, there exist values of career concerns for which teammates reduce each others’ 
direct career impact.  Figure 3.2 provides an example in which the cross-partial can be 
positive or negative (the horizontal line at zero is included for clarity).  Note that there is 
a local maximum for teammates of relatively similar seniority. 
2( i jk k− )
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Figure 3.2. Cross-partial derivative on profit in the X regime with respect to career 
concerns.  (m=1, r=.5, σ2=.25, s=2, left panel kj=1, right panel kj=2) 
Consider a team of two “peer” agents who have the same degree of career 
concerns (k1=k2).40  The profit of a firms with a peer-to-peer team equals 
2
2
(3 2 )( 4) 4
4(2 )
Xk k m s kR
k m
+ + −
+
, which  increases in the common degree of career concerns at 
a decreasing rate if m>k or ms2>4k.  In this case, a more junior team – those with high 
career concerns – is associated with higher expected profit.  Further, as synergy increases, 
the junior team becomes even more valuable.  The above observations are summarized in 
the below proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3.1.  When team output x is the only observable performance 
measure and x is not contractible, 
1) Synergy 
a) Individual effort is not affected by synergy, teamwork increases in synergy at a 
constant rate, and expected profit increases in synergy at an increasing rate. 
b) Synergy reinforces the marginal impact of career concerns (whether positive or 
negative) on teamwork.  
2) Career concerns 
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40 Note that while peers have the same degree of career concerns (i.e., the labor market’s priors about their 
ability are equally diffuse), they are not identical per se: for example, they can have different realizations of 
and expected values of ability (µ1≠µ2). 
 46
                                                
a) Each agent’s individual effort increases at a decreasing rate in his career concerns.   
b) Senior agents (ki<kj) and junior agents (ki>3kj+3m):41 A senior (junior) agent’s 
teamwork and expected firm profit both increase (decrease) in the senior (junior) 
agent’s career concerns, i.e., as the agent becomes less senior or more junior.  A 
senior (junior) agent chooses less (more) teamwork as his teammate’s career 
concerns increase. 
c) Interactions between agents’ career concerns  
i) A senior (junior) agent’s direct career effect on individual effort, ∂ei/∂ki, is 
dampened (enhanced) by increases in his teammate’s career concerns, kj.  If 
m<2kj, a senior (junior) agent i’s direct career effect on teamwork, ∂τi/∂ki, 
increases (decreases) in his teammate’s career concerns. 
ii) Teammates can strengthen or lessen each others’ direct career effect on 
expected first period profit, ∂Π1/∂ki. For a sufficiently homogeneous 
(heterogeneous) team relative to the precision of team output, teammates 
strengthen (lessen) the marginal impact of each others’ career concerns on 
expected firm profit. 
3) Peer-to-peer teams  
a) Individual effort, teamwork and expected firm profit increase at a decreasing rate 
in the common degree of career concerns, k.  Career concerns are even more 
valuable as synergy increases. 
The main takeaways from Proposition 3.1 are as follows.  First, as expected, firms 
prefer a higher synergy parameter, ceteris paribus. Second, for homogeneous teams, the 
firm is better off with junior agents.  For heterogeneous teams, however, the impact of an 
agent’s career concerns on expected firm profit and teamwork depends on the type of 
 
41 These conditions are sufficient but not necessary conditions. 
team member.  Figures 3.1 and 3.2 imply that, when only team output is observable, more 
homogeneous teams are associated with higher expected profit.   
3.3.2 Individual performance measures observable (Regime Y) 
In this regime, team output is not observable.  Instead, the parties observe non-
contractible individual performance measures for each agent.  All parties update their 
beliefs about the agent’s type based on the observed individual measures y11 and y21.  
Recall that agent j’s measure is not informative about agent i’s ability or transient shock.  
Agent i’s period 2 fixed wage is as follows (i=1,2): 
 2 11 21 1 ˆ[ | , ] ( )
Y i
i i i i
i
k
E a y y y y
k n
α µ= = +
+ 1i
−  (33) 
To solve for each agent’s period 1 effort choices, substitute the fixed wage from 
(33) into the agent’s certainty equivalent in (26), take first order conditions and solve.  
LEMMA 3.2.  When non-contractible individual input measures y11 and y21 are 
the only observable period 1 performance measures, individual (non-collaborative) effort 
and teamwork (collaborative effort) are as follows (i=1,2): 
 ,    Y Yii i ii
i i
k
e
k n k n
τ= = i
k
f
+ +
 (34) 
As with the team output regime (X), each agent’s career concerns induce both 
individual effort and teamwork.42  In regime Y, however, the labor market observes no 
measures with a synergy component, so the agents do not incorporate the 
interdependency into their effort choices, and thus synergy has no impact on either effort 
level. It is straightforward to see from (34) that both of agent i’s effort choices increase in 
his own career concerns at a decreasing rate, and neither type of effort is a function of his 
teammate’s career concerns kj (i.e., there are direct career effects but no indirect career 
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42 Note that when agent i’s teamwork is not reflected in his own performance measure (i.e., fii=0), he 
chooses no teamwork. 
effects in regime Y).  Accordingly, neither team member’s career concerns strengthens or 
lessens his teammate’s direct career effect (i.e., all cross-partials are zero). 
When the only observable measures are individual input measures, expected firm 
profit is given by: 
 ( )( ) ( )
1/ 2 2 2
11 22 1 2
1 2
1,21 2
2
(1 )
where ( )
Y i i ii Yi
i i
Yi i
k n k f Rf f k k
s
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= +
∑ ⎟
⎠  (35) 
In the Y regime, to guarantee that expected period 1 profit is positive, assume 
fii2+RYi <1.  For fii>0, profit increases in synergy at a constant rate.  The effect of agent 
i’s career concerns on profit is as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1/ 2 2 21/ 2
11 221
1/ 2 1/ 2 33 / 2
( )
2
Y
i ii Yi i Yij
i i ii j
n n k f R k Rk n f fs
k k k nk n k n
− + −∂Π
= +
∂ ++ +
/ 2
 
Note that expected firm profit may increase or decrease in career concerns, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.3.  If agent i is sufficiently senior (i.e., ki<n/(fii2+ RYi) or 
synergy is sufficiently high 
( ) ( )
3 / 2 2
1/ 2 3 / 2
11 22
2 i i Yi
i
k k R
s
f f k n
+
>
+
, profit increases in agent i’s career 
concerns.  
   
0 1 2 3 4 5
Degreeof Career Concerns ki
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
 
1
YΠ
Figure 3.3. Expected firm profit in the Y regime. (fii=.25, fjj=.25, kj=1, n=1, r=.5, σ2=.25, 
s=2) 
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Next, consider the impact of one agent’s career concerns on his teammate’s direct 
career effect on expected profit: 
 
( ) ( )
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2
1 11 22
3 3
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The cross partial is strictly positive, which indicates that for all agent types, an 
agent’s direct career effect on profit (whether positive or negative) is reinforced by his 
teammate’s career concerns.  Thus, in regime Y, a junior agent is a more desirable 
teammate for an agent whose career concerns increase profit, whereas a senior agent is a 
more desirable teammate for an agent whose career concerns decrease profit.  
Finally, consider the interaction between synergy and career concerns.  From (35)
it is clear that the cross-partial is positive.  Thus, synergy is more valuable to the principal 
in the presence of higher career concerns (more junior agents). 
When agents are peers (ki=kj=k and f11=f22=fii), expected profit equals the 
following: 
 
2
1 2
(1 ) 2 ( )
( )
Y ii Y iik f R n sf k nk
k n
− − + + +
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As in the X regime, this expression is not monotonic in career concerns for all 
parameter values because 
( )
2
1
3
(2 ( ) 2 ) ( 2 )Y ii ii Yn n sf k n f k R k k n
k k n
+ + − − +∂Π
=
∂ +
. Here, a 
homogeneous senior team can be preferred to a heterogeneous team with higher career 
concerns when the synergy parameter is sufficiently low. For example, (k1, k2) = 
(1.75,1.75) is preferred to (1.75, 2.0) in Figure 3.4 below. 
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Figure 3.4. Expected firm profit in the Y regime. (f11= f22 =.25, n=1, r=.5, σ2=.25, s=1/2) 
The above observations are summarized in the below proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3.2.  When individual input measures y11 and y21 are the only 
observable performance measures and these measures are not contractible,  
1) Synergy 
a) The synergy parameter has no impact on either effort level.  Expected profit 
increases at a constant rate in synergy. 
b) Synergy increases the marginal impact of career concerns (whether positive or 
negative) on expected profit. 
2) Career concerns 
a) Individual effort and teamwork increase at a decreasing rate in an agent’s own 
career concerns; his teammate’s degree of career concerns has no impact on the 
agent’s effort choices. 
b) Expected profit increases in career concerns for a sufficiently senior team member 
(ki<n/(fii2+ RYi)) or for sufficiently high synergy.  Regardless of type, each agent’s 
career concerns strengthens the marginal impact (positive or negative) of his 
teammate’s career concerns. 
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3) Peer-to-peer teams 
a) A homogeneous team with lower career concerns can be preferred to a 
heterogeneous team with higher career concerns (see Figure 3.4).   
The main takeaways of Proposition 3.2 are as follows.  First, as in the X regime, 
the period 1 principal strictly prefers more synergy, ceteris paribus.  Second, in a high-
synergy environment, the firm is strictly better off with junior team members; however, 
in contrast to the X regime, in a low-synergy setting, this need not hold, even for 
homogeneous teams. 
Compared with the team output regime (X), fewer results depend on the 
distinction between junior and senior agents in individual measure regime than in the 
team output regime, which is intuitively appealing because the team members do not 
incorporate the more complex team interdependency in their effort choices, and so the 
distinction is not as relevant. 
3.3.3 All performance measures observable (Regime XY) 
In this regime, both team output and individual performance measures are 
observable but not contractible.  As before, all parties update their beliefs about the 
agent’s type based on the observed period 1 measures.  Agent i’s period 2 fixed wage is 
as follows: 
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Paralleling the X regime, the correlation between agent i’s ability and the team 
output (conditional on the two individual measures), ρix, is increasing in ki and decreasing 
in kj.  Interestingly, the correlation between agent i’s ability and his own performance 
measure (conditional on team output and his teammate’s measure), ρiyi , increases in both 
agents’ degree of career concerns, ki and kj. Finally, the correlation between agent i’s 
ability and his teammate’s individual measure (conditional on team output and his own 
individual measure) decreases in both ki and kj. 
To solve for each agent’s period 1 effort choices, substitute (36) into (26), and 
take first order conditions. Without further assumptions, the first order conditions for 
teamwork are not simultaneously solvable in closed form.  There are two options to 
overcome this tractability problem: imposing ex ante symmetry across agents (i.e., 
k1=k2=k), or removing the impact of teamwork on the individual measures (i.e., 
f11=f21=f12=f22=0).  To preserve the difference among agents, and hence the differential 
career concerns, I proceed with the latter assumption.43 Solving yields Lemma 3.3. 
LEMMA 3.3.  When team output x and individual input measures y are observable 
but not contractible and fii=fij=0, individual (non-collaborative) effort and teamwork 
(collaborative effort) are as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 3 / 4 1/ 4+ ,    
2
XY XY
i ix iyi i ix jx
se ρ ρ τ ρ ρ= =  (37) 
In contrast to the Y regime, which has no teamwork unless the individual 
performance measures are sensitive to teamwork (fii>0), the XY regime has positive 
teamwork even when fii=0.  This positive teamwork parallels the X regime, where each 
agent’s teamwork incorporates both direct and indirect career effects.  
                                                 
 52
43 Assuming symmetry yields 1 2 2
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. 
Because ρix and ρiyi are both increasing in agent i’s career concerns, individual 
effort plainly increases in a team member’s own career concerns.  On the other hand, 
because ρix decreases and ρiyi increases in agent j’s career concerns, the impact of the 
indirect career effect on teamwork is not so clear. Agent i’s individual effort is affected 
by his teammate’s career concerns as follows: 
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Therefore, the indirect career effect on individual effort is negative, as in the X 
regime.  Now consider the impact of the indirect career effect on the direct career effect 
for agent i (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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The cross-partial is more positive (or less negative) for the junior team member 
(ki>kj).  Further, if he is sufficiently junior (ki>kjn2) relative to the precision of the 
individual measures, then a junior team member’s direct career effect is reinforced by the 
career concerns of his more senior teammate.  
As in the X regime, teamwork increases in synergy at a constant rate (see (37)), 
and the relationship between teamwork and career concerns is more intricate than that for 
individual effort.  Consider the direct career effect on teamwork (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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The direct career effect on teamwork is positive for a sufficiently senior agent 
(ki<3(kj+m)) or a sufficiently precise individual measure (n<3m).  Equivalently, having a 
sufficiently junior teammate (or sufficiently noisy team output) causes a senior agent’s 
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teamwork choice to increase in his own career concerns.  This result parallels the X 
regime for a similarly senior agent (ki<kj<3(kj+m)).   
The indirect career effect on agent i’s teamwork is as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j):   
( )
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For a sufficiently imprecise team output measure (m>2n and m>3kj –ki), the 
indirect career effect on teamwork is positive: each team member intensifies his 
teamwork as his teammate’s career concerns increase. 
The full expression for the effect of the interaction of teammates’ career concerns 
on agent i’s teamwork, 
2 XY
i
i jk k
τ∂
∂
, is lengthy and presented in Appendix B.  For most 
parameter values, this expression is positive (i.e., teammates reinforce each other’s direct 
career effect on teamwork).  However, Figure 3.5 demonstrates that this cross-partial can 
be positive or negative (the horizontal line at zero is included for clarity).  Specifically, 
agent j’s career concerns reduce the direct career effect on agent i’s teamwork for 
sufficiently imprecise individual performance measures relative to team output measure 
(high n relative to m) and sufficiently junior teammate j relative to agent i (high kj relative 
to ki). 
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Figure 3.5. Cross-partial derivative on teamwork in the XY regime with respect to each 
agent’s career concerns.  (kj=10, m=1, n=10, s=2) 
When team output and individual input measures are both observable, expected 
firm profit in period 1 is as follows: 
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 (38) 
Expected firm profit increases at an increasing rate in the synergy parameter for 
all agents and levels of precision.44  Interestingly, the indirect career effect on teamwork 
results above 
XY
i
jk
τ⎛ ⎞∂
⎜⎜  in the XY regime suggest that for some parameter values, expected 
net profit may increase in the variance related to the shock terms, a result that runs 
counter to the standard LEN literature but is consistent with empirical evidence 
documented by Keating [1997].  In fact, this is the case: while profit strictly decreases in 
the variance of the shock term in team output (m), there do exist parameter values for 
which profit increases in the variance of the shock terms in the individual performance 
measures (n).  Figure 3.6 presents one such example. 
⎟⎟∂⎝ ⎠
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44 To see this, note that ρ1x +ρ2x<1. 
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Figure 3.6. Expected firm profit in the XY regime. (f11=f22=0,s=2,k1=3,k2=1, m=3, r=.5, 
σ2=.25) 
The marginal impact of agent i’s career concerns on profit 1
XY
ik
⎛ ⎞∂Π
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⎟  is lengthy 
and presented in Appendix B.  Figure 3.7 illustrates that expected profit can increase or 
decrease in agent i’s degree of career concerns; profit decreases in ki for sufficiently 
junior agent i relative to his teammate j and the precision of team output.  Note the 
contrast to regime X, where the maximum occurred for approximately equal levels of 
career concerns across the team. 
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Figure 3.7. Expected firm profit in the XY regime. (f11=f22=0, kj=.1,m=.25,n=4, r=.5, 
σ2=.25, s=2) 
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Finally, consider the interaction of the team members’ career concerns, 
2
1
1 2
XY
k k
∂ Π
∂
.  
Again, the expression is lengthy and presented in Appendix B.  Figure 3.8 shows that 
there exist parameter values for which the impact of one agent’s career concerns on his 
teammate’s direct career effect on expected profit can be positive or negative (the 
horizontal zero line is included for clarity). 
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Figure 3.8. Expected firm profit in the XY regime. (f11=f22=0, kj=1, m=1, n=4, r=.5, 
σ2=.25, s=2) 
For peer-to-peer teams (ki=kj), individual effort, teamwork and expected profit all 
increase at a decreasing rate in the common degree of career concerns.  The interaction 
between career concerns and synergy is also strictly positive, indicating that not only are 
junior agents more desirable, but they are even more valuable to the firm as synergy 
increases. 
The above observations are summarized in the below proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3.3.  When team output and individual input measures are both 
observable, but none of these measures are contractible, and fii=fij=0, 45  
1) Synergy.  As in regime X where only team output is observable, 
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45 The conditions in this proposition are sufficient but not necessary conditions. 
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a) Individual effort is not affected by synergy, teamwork increases in synergy at a 
constant rate, and expected profit increases in synergy at an increasing rate. 
b) Synergy reinforces the marginal impact of career concerns (whether positive or 
negative) on teamwork.  
2) Career concerns 
a) Each agent’s individual effort increases at a decreasing rate in his career concerns 
and decreases at an increasing rate in his teammate’s career concerns.   
b) Each agent’s teamwork increases in his own career concerns if ki<3kj+3m (e.g., in 
a peer-to-peer team).  The change in an agent’s teamwork as his teammate’s 
career concerns increase depends primarily on the precision of team output. 
c) For most combinations of parameter values, expected firm profit increases in 
career concerns, but there exist parameter values for which profit decreases in 
career concerns (see Figure 3.7). 
d) Interactions between agents’ career concerns 
i) A junior agent’s (ki>kj) direct career effect on individual effort, ∂ei/∂ki, is 
more enhanced/ less diminished by increases in his teammate’s career 
concerns, kj, than vice versa.  With sufficiently precise (imprecise) individual 
measures, a junior (senior) agent’s direct career effect strictly increases 
(decreases) in his teammate’s career concerns. 
ii) For most combinations of parameter values, teammates reinforce each other’s 
direct career effect on teamwork, ∂τi/∂ki. A senior agent’s teamwork can 
decrease in his teammate’s career concerns when individual measures are 
imprecise relative to the team output measure (high n relative to m) and his 
teammate is sufficiently junior. 
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iii) There exist parameters for which teammates can strengthen or lessen each 
others’ direct career effect on expected first period profit, ∂Π1/∂ki (see Figure 
3.8). 
3) Precision 
a) For a sufficiently imprecise team output measure (m>2n and m>3 kj –ki), agent i’s 
teamwork increases in both his own and his teammate’s career concerns.   
b) Expected firm profit strictly increases in the precision of team output.  Profit can 
either increase or decrease in the precision of the individual measures. 
4) Peer-to-peer teams. As in regimes X and Y, where not all measures are observable, 
a) Individual effort, teamwork and expected firm profit increase at a decreasing rate 
in the common degree of career concerns, k.  Career concerns are even more 
valuable as synergy increases. 
The main takeaways from Proposition 3.3 are as follows.  First, consistent with 
the other regimes, firms prefer a higher synergy parameter, ceteris paribus. Second, the 
team output and individual performance measures’ precisions play a more important role 
than in the other regimes: more precision in the team output measure (or less precision in 
the individual measures) emphasizes the role of synergy in the agent’s effort choices, 
whereas more precision in the individual measures (or less precision in the team output 
measure) reduces the role of synergy.   
3.3.4 Comparison across regimes 
Comparing the period 1 principal’s expected profit across regimes is equivalent to 
comparing agency welfare.  Each agent’s expected overall compensation (regardless of 
regime) is simply twice his ex ante expected ability, or 2 µi, because the period 1 
principal sets the fixed wage to exactly satisfy the participation constraints.  The period 2 
principal’s expected profit equals zero.  
Because the model has no explicit cost for each performance measure, one might 
expect that more performance measures are inherently better (i.e. lead to higher profit).  
Surprisingly, this is not the case.  Consider the following example with peer-to-peer 
teams, where agents have the same degree of career concerns (k1=k2=k): 
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Figure 3.9. Expected firm profit in the X, Y and XY regimes.   (f11= f22 =0, m=1, n=1, 
r=.5, σ2=.25, left panel: s=2, right panel:  s=10) 
Figure 3.9 illustrates that for a high synergy parameter, the team-output-only 
regime (X) can dominate the regime with incremental individual performance measures 
(XY).  Both of these regimes increase in synergy at an increasing rate, whereas the 
individual-performance-measure-only regime (Y) increases in synergy at a constant rate.  
Thus, the addition of the individual performance measures to the team output measure 
dilutes the rate at which firm’s expected profit increases in synergy.   
It is also straightforward that either regime X or regime Y can dominate when the 
precision of their associated performance measure is sufficiently high relative to the other 
regime.  However, even for comparable precision levels, either regime can dominate, as 
seen in Figure 3.10.  For sufficiently low levels of synergy, regime Y has higher expected 
profit than regime X. 
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Figure 3.10.  Expected firm profit in the X and Y regimes. (f11= f22 =0, m=1.5, n=1.5, 
r=.5, σ2=.25,s=1)   
The above discussion highlights that there is a nontrivial interaction between 
synergy and career concerns, even for peer-to-peer teams, for whom expected profit 
strictly increases in career concerns.  To the extent that a firm could choose which 
performance measures are observable, the regime under which a principal is best off 
depends critically on the level of potential synergy and the career concerns of team 
members. 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigates the interaction between team synergy and career 
concerns across settings where different performance measures are observed. 
Specifically, I study the impact on a team member’s non-collaborative and collaborative 
effort choices and on the resulting firm profit of (i) the degree of potential synergy, (ii) a 
team member’s own career concerns, (iii) his teammate’s career concerns, (iv) the 
interaction between the career concerns of different team members, and (v) the 
interaction between synergy and career concerns.   
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The results indicate that even in the absence of contractible performance 
measures, career concerns induce positive effort levels, and the potential for synergy 
interacts with career concerns to produce collaborative effort.  In a high synergy 
environment, firms are better off having at least one performance measure that reflects  
potential synergy, or team members under-invest in teamwork.  Conversely, in a low 
synergy environment, firms are better off having at least one performance measure that 
does not reflect potential synergy, or team members over-invest in teamwork.  Further, 
even in the absence of explicit costs for each performance measure, more performance 
measures are not necessarily better. 
A regime in which only output measures (i.e., measures that reflect synergy) are 
observable has the highest profit in high-synergy settings.  In this regime, firms are best 
off with a homogeneous team of junior agents (those with higher career concerns).  When 
the team is not homogeneous, team composition has a major impact on results, with 
opposite results for junior and senior agents.  Expected firm profit increases in a senior 
agent’s career concerns but decreases in a junior agent’s career concerns. The increase or 
decrease in profit is driven by a corresponding change in teamwork: senior agents choose 
more teamwork as career concerns increase, whereas junior agents choose less teamwork 
as career concerns increase.  
A regime in which only individual input measures (i.e. measures that don’t reflect 
synergy) are observable has the highest profit in low-synergy settings.  In this regime, 
firms may be better off with junior or senior agents, depending on the extent of the 
potential synergy. 
A regime in which both input and output measures are observable may or may not 
dominate regimes in which only one of the measures is observable.  In this regime, 
performance measure precision plays an important role: the role of synergy is enhanced 
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by more precision in the team output measure or less precision in the individual 
measures. 
As with all analytic models, the modeling choices limit the generalizability of the 
results.  Some of the more important assumptions include the common observance of all 
parameters by all parties (e.g., everyone knows the synergy parameter).  The specific 
functional forms chosen also reduce the applicability of the model.  The assumption of 
non-contractible performance measures, while a limitation, is mitigated by the analysis in 
chapter 4, which considers the same observability regimes with contractible measures. 
 
 64
                                                
Chapter 4: Team Synergy,  Career Concerns and Incentive Pay 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a direct extension of chapter 3, which models team synergy and 
differential career concerns in a multiple-agent, multiple-task dynamic model where an 
interactive synergy term is present.  Chapter 3 considers non-contractible performance 
measures only.  The purpose of this chapter is to explore the same phenomena, career 
concerns and team synergy, in a setting with contractible measures, and to compare the 
results across parallel contractible versus non-contractible regimes.  
As in chapter 3, this chapter models a firm that hires two agents to work together 
on a one-period team project under the following (exogenously specified) performance 
measure regimes: (1) an output measure that includes a synergy component, (2) a pair of 
individual input measures with no such synergy component, or (3) both input and output 
measures.  I similarly assume that the agents who comprise the team have varying 
degrees of career concerns and that the second period measures have no effort 
component; this latter assumption eliminates ratchet effects from the analysis and allows 
more parsimonious solutions.   
I model a short-term contracting environment where all observable performance 
measures are contractible.  I analyze the optimal individual effort and teamwork in each 
regime; however, limited analysis of incentive weights is possible without imposing the 
additional restriction of “peer” agents, i.e., agents with the same levels of career 
concerns.46  With these further assumptions in place, I solve for incentive weights.  
 
46 For clarity, note that while peers have the same degree of career concerns, they are not identical per se: 
they can have different realizations of and expected values of ability. 
The results indicate that firms are better off with higher synergy potential and 
teams of agents with low career concerns.  In general, synergy reinforces the benefit from 
senior agents.  This contrasts with non-contractible performance measurement regimes, 
where firms are better off with teams of junior agents, and synergy causes those junior 
agents to be even more valuable to the firm.  The reason for this difference is that in the 
absence of explicit incentives, a firm must rely on career concerns to induce effort (so the 
more career concerns, the more effort), whereas when a firm can induce effort via explicit 
incentives, career concerns distort the effort level away from the second best (and the 
more career concerns, the more distortion).  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 sets up the model.  
Section 4.3 presents the model solutions.  Section 4.4 compares non-contractible results 
from chapter 3 to the contractible results from Section 4.3.  Section 4.5 discusses 
limitations and concludes. 
4.2. THE MODEL47 
Consider a two-period model where each period a risk-neutral principal hires two 
risk- and effort-averse agents for a one-period task.  Each agent has ability ai, which is 
constant across periods and firms.48  In the first period, agent i (i=1,2) chooses individual 
non-negative effort, ei, and teamwork, ti.  In period 1, team output x1 is a linearly additive 
function of agent abilities a1 and a2, individual efforts e1 and e2, a team synergy term, 
s(τ1τ2)1/2, and a transient shock, εx1.  In period 2, team output consists only of ability and 
a transient shock, as follows:49 
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2i
47 This model setup is identical to chapter 3 except for the wage structure, which includes incentive pay in 
this chapter.  I repeat the setup here (verbatim) for the reader’s convenience. 
48 To avoid confusion, the index i always refers to which agent, and the index t indicates which period. 
49 Period 2 team output could be 2i i xx a ε= + ; that is, the team need not exist in period 2.  
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where s>0 is an exogenous parameter known to all parties that represents the strength of 
the synergy. The individual performance measures, if they exist, are linearly additive 
functions of ability ai, individual effort ei, and teamwork τi and a transient shock, εyit, as 
follows: 
  1 1
2 2
    1,2
                             
i i it ii i ij j yi
i i yi
y a e f f
i
y a
τ τ ε
ε
= + + + + ⎫⎪ =⎬= + ⎪⎭
This functional form reflects that disentangling agent’s individual effort from his 
teamwork may not be possible.  For example, billable hours may reflect a combination of 
time spent in individual effort and helping one’s teammates.  When this is the case, only 
an aggregate measure of the two types of effort is observable, and the parameter fii∈[0,1] 
represents the weight of agent i’s teamwork (relative to his individual effort) on his own 
measure.  Further, a team member’s individual performance measure may increase when 
his teammate assists him.  The parameter fij∈[0,1] represents the weight of agent j’s 
teamwork (relative to agent i’s individual effort) on agent i’s individual performance 
measure.50 
For simplicity, let the agents’ abilities be independent of each other and of all 
transient shocks; likewise, let all shock terms be independent. The random variables are 
normally distributed as follows: 
                                                 
50 I restrict the upper bound on fii and fij to ensure positive expected firm profit in all regimes (specifically, 
in the regime where only individual measures are observable).  It seems intuitive that one or both of the fii 
and fij parameters will be zero in certain cases.  For generality, I include both parameters whenever 
tractable.  
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The variable µi represents the ex ante expected value of agent i’s ability.  The 
variable ki represents the amount of variance in team output that relates to ability and can 
be interpreted as agent i’s degree of career concerns: higher values of ki represent more 
diffuse priors about the agent’s ability.  The variables m and n, respectively, represent the 
performance measure variance related to the transient shock in the team output and 
individual performance measures. 
Each agent’s cost of effort is a twice-differentiable convex increasing function of 
individual effort and teamwork.  For simplicity, assume the costs of each type of effort 
are additively separable. In period 2, there is no effort and accordingly no effort cost. In 
period 1, total cost of effort ci has the functional form: 
 2 21 1 ,    for 1, 2
2 2i i i
c e iτ= + =   
Each agent has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function: 
  (39) 1 2
2 2 1
exp{ [ ]}
1,2
exp{ [ ] | } 
N N N N
i i i i i
N N N
i i i i
u r w w c
i
u r w c p
⎫≡ − − + − ⎪ =⎬
≡ − − − ⎪⎭
where ri œ (0,¶) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion for agent i 
and p1N consists of the observable period 1 performance measures in regime N.51 
For tractability, each principal offers both agents a linear wage in each period 
based on the performance measures contractible in the regime: 
 ,    for , , 1, 2,  it it it t it it it jtw x y y i j t i jα β γ δ= + + + = ≠  
                                                 
51 Regime Nœ{XC, YC, XYC} refers to the contractible regime where only performance measures x or y or both, 
respectively, are observable.  
where the incentive weight on any non-contractible performance measure is zero. 
All parties – the principal and all labor market firms – have access to all 
observable period 1 performance measures.  Conditional on observing these realizations, 
the principal and labor market update their priors about each agent’s ability.  The labor 
market is perfectly competitive and sets each agent’s reservation utility as follows: 
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4.3. ANALYSIS  
In this section, I consider performance measurement regimes where exogenously 
specified performance measures are contractible.  Obtaining closed form solutions for the 
incentive weights requires assuming peer agents (“symmetry”); while I do not impose 
symmetry to obtain effort solutions, I do impose symmetry to obtain expressions for 
incentive weights and expected profit.   
All regimes are solved by backward induction.  Because the agents have no period 
2 action (and no associated effort cost), the principal offers no incentive; the incentive 
has a marginal cost but no marginal benefit.  Thus, all period 2 incentive weights equal 
zero (hereafter suppressed in the notation) and the fixed wage equals the reservation 
wage.  Further, the fixed wages in the contractible period 2 regimes are exactly 
equivalent to the non-contractible regimes in chapter 3, and 2 [ | ]
N
i iE a pα = , which 
implies: 
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Substituting αi2N into agent i’s expected utility from (39) and rewriting utility in 
the certainty equivalent form yields: 
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The period 1 principal maximizes expected profit as follows: 
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The period 1 principal’s objective function can be rewritten as: 
 1 1 1 2
1,2
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Π = − − + − +∑ 2i  (43) 
4.3.1 Team output measure contractible (Regime XC) 
In this subsection, I consider a contracting regime where team output is 
observable and contractible, but no individual performance measures exist (i.e., γi=δi=0).  
To solve for each agent’s period 1 effort choices, substitute 2
XC
iα  into (42), take first order 
conditions and solve.   
LEMMA 4.1.  When contractible team output x is the only observable 
performance measure, individual (non-collaborative) effort and teamwork (collaborative 
effort) are as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 ( ) ( )3 / 4 1/ 4
1 2
,    
2
XC XC XC XC XC XCi
i i i i i j
k se B B
k k m
β τ= + ≡ =
+ +
B  (44) 
PROOF: All proofs are in Appendix C.52 
Collectively, the explicit and implicit incentives represent the total incentive 
weight on period 1 individual effort, which I define as Bi for convenience.  Agent i’s 
teamwork equals 3 / 4 1/ 4 0
2 i j
s e e > .  The synergy term induces positive teamwork that is a 
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52 There is no subgame problem in this or any regime modeled.  That is, neither agent has a profitable 
deviation when his teammate chooses the equilibrium effort level.  Furthermore, although some of the 
regimes have multiple equilibria, there is only one equilibrium in each regime with positive effort levels: 
the other equilibria have zero, negative or complex effort levels. 
function of both an agent’s own career concerns ki (the “direct” career effect) and those 
of his teammate, kj (the “indirect” career effect).53   
To solve for the incentive weights, impose symmetry (i.e., let k1=k2=k, r1=r2=r, 
f11=f22=fii, and f12=f21=fij), substitute the agent’s solutions into (43), take first order 
conditions and solve.   
LEMMA 4.2.  When contractible team output x is the only observable 
performance measure, the incentive weight for symmetric agents is as follows (i=1,2): 
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The explicit incentive weight consists of the total incentive weight, 
2
2 2
4
4 4 (2 )
XC
i
sB
s r kσ
+
=
+ + + m
, less the common career effect.  This result is consistent 
with prior work (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy [1992], Meyer and Vickers [1997], Autrey et 
al. [2005]) in which the principal attempts to undo implicit incentives by adjusting the 
explicit incentives accordingly.  Without enough degrees of freedom, the principal cannot 
undo all implicit incentives (Autrey et al. [2005]); that is also the case in this model 
because there are two types of effort to induce and only one performance measure with 
which to adjust effort levels. 
Substituting (45) into the effort expressions in (44) yields the expressions for 
individual effort and teamwork (i=1,2): 
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53 Meaningful comparative statics cannot be performed until after solutions for the incentive weights have 
been obtained, because the incentive weights are also a function of the model’s parameters.  Solving for the 
incentive weights in closed form requires assuming identically distributed agents.  As a result, I cannot 
analyze the impact of one teammate’s individual career concerns on his own or his teammate’s effort 
choices. 
Clearly, both types of effort strictly increase in synergy.  Further, for sufficiently 
high (low) career concerns or sufficiently low (high) synergy, both individual effort and 
teamwork increase at an increasing (decreasing) rate in synergy (i=1,2): 
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It is also straightforward to see from (46) that both types of effort strictly decrease 
(at an increasing rate) in the agents’ common degree of career concerns, k. This happens 
because the principal sets the explicit incentive to offset the implicit incentive, which 
increases in k.  Thus, since the teamwork of a pair of agents with sufficiently high career 
concerns decreases in career concerns, ceteris paribus, one might expect less effort from a 
junior team because of the costly risk associated with career concerns. 
The interaction between synergy and career concerns is as follows (i=1,2): 
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Here, when synergy is sufficiently high, it reinforces the overall career effect, 
whereas if the risk premium is sufficiently high, synergy lessens the overall career effect.  
Thus, a junior team might exert even less effort in the presence of high synergy because it 
exacerbates the agent’s risk cost.  Note that this effect is stronger for teamwork than for 
individual effort; it takes substantially more synergy for the career effect to be reinforced.  
This happens because the synergy multiplier creates relatively more risk for teamwork 
(which creates synergy). 
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The period 1 principal’s expected profit in the XC regime is as follows: 
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 (47) 
Expected firm profit increases at an increasing rate in the synergy parameter but 
decreases at an increasing rate in career concerns. Thus, in the XC regime, senior people 
– those with low career concerns – are associated with higher expected profit.  The 
interaction between synergy and career concerns affects profit as follows: 
 
( )
2 2 4
1
32 2
32 (2 )( 4)
4 4 (2 )
XC r k m ss
s k s r k m
σ
σ
∂ Π + +
= −
∂ ∂ + + +
2
 
Therefore, synergy and career concerns are countervailing forces.  As a team 
becomes more junior, the benefit from synergy decreases.  Equivalently, as synergy 
increases, senior agents are even more valuable to the firm.  
PROPOSITION 4.1.  When contractible team output x is the only observable 
performance measure and agents have the same degree of career concerns, 
1. Individual effort, teamwork and expected profit all increase in synergy at a 
non-constant rate and decrease at an increasing rate in career concerns. 
2. Synergy and career concerns are countervailing forces on expected firm profit, 
but they can be reinforcing or countervailing forces on individual effort and 
teamwork.   
4.3.2 Individual performance measures contractible (Regime YC) 
In this subsection, I consider contracting regimes where team output is not 
observable or contractible (and thus βi=0).  Instead, the parties have access to individual 
performance measures for each agent.  To solve for each agent’s period 1 effort choices, 
substitute the YC regime period 2 fixed wage from (41) into the agent’s certainty 
equivalent in (42), take first order conditions and solve.  
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LEMMA 4.3.  When contractible individual input measures y11 and y21 are the 
only observable period 1 performance measures, individual (non-collaborative) effort and 
teamwork (collaborative effort) are as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 ,    YC YC YC YC YC YCii i i i ii i ji i
i
k
e G f G
k n
fγ τ= + ≡ = +
+
δ  (48) 
As in the team output regime, individual effort ei differs only by the period 1 
explicit incentive.  For convenience, I define the total incentive weight, Gi, on period 1 
individual effort.  To solve for the incentive weights, impose symmetry, substitute the 
agent’s solutions into (43), take first order conditions and solve.   
LEMMA 4.4.  When contractible individual input measures y11 and y21 are the 
only performance measures observable in period 1, the incentive weights for symmetric 
agents are as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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 (49) 
As in the XC regime, the explicit incentive weight on an agent’s own individual 
measure consists of the total incentive weight, , less the common career effect.  
Substituting (49) into (48) yields the effort expressions for regime YC  (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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In this regime, without a synergy component in the explicit incentive, the team’s 
effort choices will be unaffected by synergy.  As a result, the principal includes the 
synergy parameter (linearly) in the incentive weights, and individual effort and teamwork 
increase in synergy at a constant rate.   
An agent’s effort choices are affected by career concerns as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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Individual effort decreases in the common degree of career concerns k for either a 
sufficiently low synergy parameter (s<2fii) or a sufficiently low sensitivity of one agent’s 
individual measure to his teammate’s teamwork (fji<rσ2(k+n)).54  In contrast, teamwork 
decreases in career concerns for a sufficiently high synergy parameter (s>2fii).  Note that 
since fii∈[0,1], a synergy parameter of 2 or more suffices. 
The expression for the rate at which effort changes in career concerns is as 
follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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Figure 4.1 demonstrates that these expressions can be positive or negative, 
depending primarily on the synergy parameter and the sensitivity of an individual 
measure to a teammate’s teamwork (the horizontal line at zero is in included for clarity). 
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Figure 4.1. Rate of change of effort in career concerns in the YC regime (fii=1, n=1, 
r=1,σ2=1, left panel s=9, right panel s=0.5) 
The interaction between synergy and career concerns in the YC regime is as 
follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
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Thus, synergy and career concerns are strictly countervailing forces on teamwork.  
These forces may be complementary on individual effort if and only if (fji<rσ2(k+n)).  
For example, the condition fji<rσ2(k+n) holds in a sufficiently noisy setting, and thus 
individual effort decreases (increases) as agents become more junior (senior), and 
synergy reinforces this reduction (expansion). 
When the only observable measures are individual input measures,  
 ( )2 2 2 2 2 21 1 ( 4) ( ) 4 4 ( )4
YC
ji ii ii ji
Y
f s r k n sf s f f
D
σ⎡ ⎤Π = + + + + + +⎣ ⎦  (50) 
From this expression, it is clear that expected firm profit strictly increases at an 
increasing rate in the synergy parameter s.  The impact of career concerns on firm profit 
is as follows: 
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Thus, expected firm profit strictly decreases in career concerns.  This is intuitively 
appealing in a contractible environment: the firm prefers to induce the second-best effort 
level, but career concerns distort the actual effort level induced.  The principal doesn’t 
have enough degrees of freedom to completely undo the career effect, and thus the more 
career concerns, the more distortion remains, and the lower expected profit becomes. 
The impact of the interaction between synergy and career concerns on profit is: 
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When synergy is sufficiently high relative to sensitivity (specifically, when s>2fii 
or s>fii /[rσ2(k+n)]), synergy reduces the rate at which profit decreases in k.55  In general, 
synergy and career concerns have countervailing effects on firm profit in the YC regime. 
Consider the special case where an agent’s performance measure has no 
sensitivity to his teamwork, but his teammate’s measure does (i.e., fii=0, fji>0).  In this 
case, individual effort (teamwork) strictly decreases in career concerns at a non-constant 
(strictly decreasing) rate.  Synergy has no impact on the career effect on individual effort, 
whereas synergy and career concerns are countervailing forces on teamwork and 
expected profit. 
PROPOSITION 4.2.  When contractible individual input measures y11 and y21 are 
the only performance measures observable in period 1, and agents have the same degree 
of career concerns, 
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55 This is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition.  It is difficult, but possible to find parameter values 
such that expected profit increases in k.  One such example is k∈[1,5],n→0,s→0, r = σ2 = fji=1. 
1. Individual effort and teamwork increase in synergy at a constant rate; 
expected profit increases in synergy at an increasing rate. 
2. Individual effort and teamwork can either increase or decrease in career 
concerns; expected profit strictly decreases in career concerns. 
3. Synergy and career concerns are strictly countervailing forces on teamwork.  
For sufficiently high synergy (s>2fii), this is also true for expected firm profit.  
However, these forces are countervailing for individual effort if and only if 
(fji>rσ2(k+n)). 
In this regime, note that while either type of effort can increase in the common 
degree of career concerns, k, nevertheless, expected firm profit always decreases in career 
concerns.  This occurs because when individual effort increases in career concerns, 
teamwork decreases in career concerns, and vice versa.  The net effect is always that 
profit decreases in k. 
4.3.3 All performance measures contractible (Regime XYC) 
In this regime, both team output and individual performance measures are 
contractible.  To solve for each agent’s period 1 effort choices, substitute the period 2 
regime XYC fixed wage from (41) into (42), and take first order conditions. In this 
regime, to obtain closed form solutions I assume f11=f21=f12=f22=0. 
LEMMA 4.5.  When contractible team output x and individual input measures y 
are observable, individual (non-collaborative) effort and teamwork (collaborative effort) 
are as follows (i,j=1,2, i≠j): 
 ( ) ( )3 / 4 1/ 4,    2
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se B G B Bτ= + =  (51) 
 where ,  +XYC XYC XYC XYCi i ix i i iyiB Gβ ρ γ≡ + ≡ ρ  
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To solve for the incentive weights, impose symmetry, substitute the agent’s 
solutions into (43), take first order conditions and solve.   
LEMMA 4.6.  When team output x and individual input measures y11 and y21 are 
all observable and contractible in period 1, the incentive weights for symmetric agents are 
as follows (i=1,2): 
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Paralleling the team-output-only and individual-measure-only regimes, the 
explicit incentive weight on each individual measure consists of the total incentive weight 
for that measure, respectively, less agent i’s direct implicit incentives (if any) related to 
that measure.   
Substituting (52) into (51) yields the effort expressions (i=1,2): 
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Synergy influences the effort choices as follows (i=1,2): 
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Individual effort and teamwork increase in synergy at a non-constant (i.e., 
increasing or decreasing) rate.  Because team output is observable, the agents internalize 
the potential synergy and incorporate it in their teamwork level, as in regime XC.  The 
principal also includes the synergy parameter in the incentive weights.   
The expressions for the impact of career concerns on an agent’s effort are lengthy 
and included in Appendix C.  However, these expressions are interpretable: individual 
effort and teamwork both strictly decrease at an increasing rate in the agents’ common 
degree of career concerns k.   
The interaction between synergy and career concerns in the XYC regime is also 
lengthy and included in Appendix C.  Figure 4.2 illustrates that these expressions may be 
either positive or negative (the horizontal line at zero is included for clarity); thus, 
synergy and career concerns may be countervailing or reinforcing forces on effort: 
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Figure 4.2. Impact of interaction between synergy and career concerns on effort, in XYC 
regime (fii= fii=0, k=1, m=1, n=4 r=σ2=1, s=1) 
In the XYC regime, expected firm profit is as follows (when fii = fji =0): 
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The comparative static expressions for the impact on expected firm profit of 
synergy, career concerns, and the interaction of synergy and career concerns are lengthy 
and included in Appendix C.  However, these expressions are interpretable: profit strictly 
increases at an increasing rate in synergy and strictly decreases at a decreasing rate in 
career concerns.  Furthermore, synergy and career concerns have a strictly countervailing 
impact on expected profit. 
PROPOSITION 4.3.  When team output x and individual input measures y11 and 
y21 are all observable and contractible in period 1, and agents have the same degree of 
career concerns, 
1. Individual effort and teamwork increase in synergy at a non-constant rate; 
expected profit increases in synergy at an increasing rate. 
2. Individual effort and teamwork decrease at an increasing rate in career 
concerns; expected profit strictly decreases at a decreasing rate in career 
concerns. 
3. Synergy and career concerns may have a countervailing or a reinforcing 
impact on individual effort and teamwork.  However, these forces are strictly 
countervailing for expected profit. 
4.3.4 Comparison across regimes 
In this subsection, I compare the results across regimes, focusing on the impact on 
total agency welfare.  Note that comparing the period 1 principal’s expected profit across 
regimes is equivalent to comparing agency welfare because each agent’s expected 
compensation simply equals twice his ex ante expected ability, or 2 µi, regardless of 
regime, and the period 2 principal’s expected profit equals zero.56  
 
56 As in chapter 3, the period 1 principal sets the fixed wage to exactly satisfy the participation constraints 
in all regimes.   The participation constraint equals U1+E[U2], and both of these terms equal µi. 
Profit is not identical across regimes, despite the fact that in each regime the 
principal does exactly offset the career component in effort. Conditional on a given 
performance measurement regime, profit is identical whether the labor market observes 
the performance measure or not.  However, this does not imply that scenarios with 
different performance measures are identical.  Further, although the principal reverses the 
career effect on effort, career concerns remain a component of the risk premium. 
First, consider the difference in profit between regime XC and YC.  Both regimes 
increase in synergy at an increasing rate.  When fii=fji=0, synergy favors regime XC more 
than regime YC, and career concerns favor regime YC over XC: 
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When fii=fji=1, the difference between regimes is as follows: 
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In this case, very high synergy still favors the XC regime, but intermediate values 
of synergy may now favor the YC regime instead.  This is demonstrated in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. Expected firm profit in the XC and YC regimes (k=3, m=1.5, n=1.5, 
r=2,σ2=1, left panel fii= fii=0, right panel fii= fii=1) 
 81
Next, I consider the difference between the XYC regime, in which both types of 
measures available, and the XC and YC regimes, in which only one type of measure is 
available. Because the model has no explicit cost for each performance measure, one 
might expect that more performance measures are inherently better (i.e. lead to higher 
profit).  This is clearly the case in the XYC versus YC regime comparison: 
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The XYC versus XC comparison, however, is ambiguous: 
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For sufficiently extreme (high or low) values of synergy, career concerns, or 
variance in team output, 24 ( )R km k n s> +  and XYC dominates XC.  
Collectively, these comparisons across regimes provide a measure of the expected 
value of supplementing a contractible individual measure with a contractible team output 
measure.   
4.4. COMPARISON ACROSS CONTRACTIBLE AND NON-CONTRACTIBLE REGIMES 
This section compares the contractible performance measure results from the 
analysis above with the results for non-contractible performance measures derived in 
chapter 3.  I use the non-contractible results for identically distributed team members (the 
“peer-to-peer” teams special case) in this comparison because solving the contractible 
case in closed form requires this restriction. 
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Firms with exogenously contractible performance measures are better off with 
more senior people, whereas firms with exogenously non-contractible performance 
measures receive more benefit from junior people.  Intuitively, in the absence of 
contractibility, firms must rely on career concerns to induce individual effort and synergy 
to induce teamwork.  However, contractible performance measures provide the firm more 
degrees of freedom to induce desired effort levels, and thus the firm can adjust the 
incentive weights to reduce the agent’s effort level accordingly.   
 These observations are summarized in the following corollary. 
COROLLARY 4.1.  For teams of identically distributed agents, 
1. Profit increases in synergy regardless of regime or contractibility.   
2. With non-contractible measures, profit increases in career concerns.  With 
contractible measures, profit decreases in career concerns.   
3. With non-contractible measures, synergy reinforces the benefit of a junior 
team. With contractible measures, if at least one measure is an output 
measure, synergy enhances the benefit of a senior team.  With only a 
contractible individual measure, synergy may either strengthen or lessen the 
benefit of a senior team. 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter studies the role of career concerns, team synergy and the interaction 
between the two.  I model a team setting where two agents choose individual, non-
collaborative effort that does not generate synergy and collaborative effort (teamwork) 
that does generate synergy.  The labor market can observe one or more types of 
contractible performance measures – either team output or individual input measures or 
both – which creates career concerns.   
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The results indicate that firms with contractible performance measures are better 
off with teams of senior agents.  As expected, firms also prefer more synergy to less.  
Furthermore, when an output measure is available (regimes XC and XYC), higher synergy 
makes senior agents even more valuable to the firm.  When only individual measures are 
available (regime YC), synergy may either reinforce or reduce the benefits of senior 
agents. Specifically, in a setting with low synergy, low risk premium and high sensitivity 
of agent’s individual measure to his own teamwork, synergy diminishes the benefits of 
senior agents. 
The model predicts that the role of career concerns depends critically on 
contractibility: career concerns are an essential and desirable agent characteristic in a 
non-contractible setting, but a dysfunctional and undesirable agent characteristic in a 
contractible setting.  The model also provides a measure of the expected value of 
supplementing an existing contractible measure of one type (collective team output or 
individual input measure) with a contractible measure of the other type. 
As with all analytic models, the modeling choices limit the generalizability of the 
results.  Some of the more important assumptions include the common observance of all 
parameters by all parties (e.g., everyone knows the synergy parameter).  The specific 
functional forms chosen also reduce the applicability of the model.  The assumption of 
contractible performance measures, while a limitation, is mitigated by the analysis in 
chapter 3, which considers the same observability regimes with non-contractible 
measures. 
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LEMMA 2.1.  Regime Z. 
2 2
1/ 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
1
1 1 var 0,    
2 2 2
1( ) ( 2 )
2 2
0
2
Z Z Zi
i i i i i j i i i i i i i
i i
Z i
i i j j i i i zi i zj i i z zi zj
Z Z Z z zi
i i zj i z i zi zj i i
i zj
i j jZ
i i
r
CE e e e w e q
p q
r
s q q q
r r
q qs
α κ λ τ τ κ
κ κ κ κ σ λ σ κ λ ρ σ σ
ρ σ
λ σ κ ρ σ σ λ κ
λ σ
κ
κ κ
= + + − − − ⇒ = =
⎛ ⎞Π = − + + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∂
Π = − − = ⇒ = −
∂
⎛ ⎞∂
Π = ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∑
Z
/ 2
2
1/ 2
2 2 3 / 4 2 2 1/ 4
( ) 0
( )
   for , 1, 2,  
2 ( (1 )) ( (1 ))
Z
i i i zi i z i zi zj
i jZ
i
i i zi z j j zj z
q r r
q qs i j i j
q r q r
κ σ λ ρ σ σ
κ
σ ρ σ ρ
− + − =
⇒ = = ≠
+ − + −
 
▲
Conditions for regime Y>Z. 
2 2 1/ 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2
0         ( (1 )) ( (1 ))
1
2 4(1 ) (1 )
2
(1 ) (1 )
Y Z
Z i i zi z j j zj z
j i ji
Zi i yi y j j yj y
jiZ
i j i i yi y j j yj y
D q r q r
p q qp s
Dp r p r
ppD
s
q q p r p r
σ ρ σ ρ
σ ρ σ ρ
σ ρ σ ρ
Π − Π > ≡ + − + −
⎛ ⎞
⇔ + >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ − + −⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
⇔ + >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ − + −⎝ ⎠
1/ 2
 
 
LEMMA 2.2. Regime YZ. 
2 2
1/ 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 var
2 2 2
,    
( )
1 1 ( 2 )
2 2 2
( 2 )
2
YZ i
i i i i i j i i i j i i i
i i
YZ YZ YZ YZ
i i i i i i
YZ
i i j j i j i j
i
i i i i i yi i yj i i y yi yj
i
i zi i zj i i z zi zj
r
CE e e e e e w
p q
e p q
p p s q q
r
p q
r
α γ δ κ λ τ
γ τ κ
γ γ κ κ
γ κ γ σ δ σ γ δ ρ σ σ
κ σ λ σ κ λ ρ σ σ
= + + + + − − −
⇒ = =
Π = + +
⎛ + + + +⎜
− ⎜
⎜ + + +⎜
⎝
,  , ,  ,      for 1, 2,Y Z YZ Y YZ Y YZ Z YZ Zi i i i i i i i i i
 
jγ γ δ δ κ κ λ λ
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
= Π + Π ⇒ = = = = = ≠
∑
▲
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LEMMA 2.3. Regime X.57 
( ) ( )
1/ 2 2 2
1/ 2 3
3 / 4 1/ 4
2 2 2
1/ 22 2
2 2 2
1 1( ( ) ) var    
2 2 2
4
0  
2 2
1 1 (
4 2 2 2 4
X X Xi
i i i i j i j i i i i i i
i i
jX X X Xi i
i i i j i i i j j
i i i i
X i
i i j j i i j j i i i x
i
r
CE e e s e w e p
p q
s sCE q q q
s q
rs sp p s q q p
q
α β τ τ τ β
τβ τ
τ τ τ β β
τ τ β
β β β β β β σ
= + + + − − − ⇒ =
⎛ ⎞∂
= − = ⇒ = ⇒ =⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
Π = + + − + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1/ 2
3
1/ 22
2
) ( )
( ) (4 3 ) 0,      for 1, 2,
16
i i j j
i j jX
i i i i x j j i i
i i
q q
q qsp p r q q i i j
β β
β
β σ β β
β β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞∂
Π = − + + − − = = ≠⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∑
 
▲
The sign of ∂eiX/∂βjX. 
 
From equation (12), eiX = pi βiX.  Thus, pi(∂βiX/∂βjX )= ∂eiX/∂βjX.  Define equation (14) as 
G(βi, βj)=0.  Per the Implicit Function Theorem,  
* * * * 1
* *
* * * *
* *
* *
*
If ( , ) solves ( , )=0 and if ( , ) 0,  then  a C  function ( ) 
( , )
near  such that ( )  and ( ) .  Thus,
( , )
( , )
( )
i j i j i j i j
i
i j
ji
j i j i j
j
i j
i
i j
ji
j
j
GG
G
G
G
G
β β β β β β β
β
β β
ββ
β β β β β
β β β
β
β β
ββ
β
β
β
β∂ ≠ ∃
∂
∂
∂∂
= = −
∂∂
∂
∂
∂∂
= −
∂∂
∂ ( )
1/ 2
2
* *
* *
1/ 2*2* *
2 *
* 3
(4 3 3 )
32
( , ) (4 3 )
32 ( )
i j
i i j j
i j
i j ji j
i i x i i j ji
i
q qs q q
q qsp r q q
β β
β β
ββ β σ β
β
⎛ ⎞
− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠= −
⎛ ⎞
− + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
*β
 
( )
1/ 2
2
* *
* *
*
1/ 2*2
2 *
* 3
(4 3 3 )
32
                       ( )
(4 3 )
32 ( )
i j
i i i j
i ji
j
j i j j
i i x i i j j
i
q qsp q q
e
q qsp r q q
β β
β β
β
β β *
j
σ β β
β
⎛ ⎞
− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⇒ =
∂ ⎛ ⎞
+ + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
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57 Second order conditions 
1 / 22 2
2
2 3
(4 3 ) 0,  because <4. 
32
i j jX
i i x i j j
i i
q qs
p r
β
σ β β
β β
∂
Π = − − − + − <
∂
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
β  
This expression can be positive or negative.  Two examples (which differ only in q): 
1) If s=2, ri=2, rj=1, σx=1, pi=pj=1, qi=qj=1, then (βi*, βj*)=(0.506604, 0.663951) 
solves G=0, ∂G /∂βi (βi*, βj*)≠0, and ∂βi/∂βj (βi*, βj*)= ∂ei/∂βj= 0.0240758. 
2) If s=2, ri=2, rj=1, σx=1, pi=pj=1, qi=qj=4, then (βi*, βj*)=(0.148744, 0.621495) 
solves G=0, ∂G /∂βi (βi*, βj*)≠0, and ∂βi/∂βj (βi*, βj*)= ∂ei/∂βj= -0.335905. 
Regime X for identical agents. 
Substituting pi=pj=p and qi=qj=q and ri=rj=r into equation (14) yields: 
2 2
2
2 2
4( ) (1 ) 0 
4 4 4
X X
x i
i x
s q p s qp p r q
p s q r
β σ β β
β σ
∂ +
Π = − + + − = ⇒ =
∂ + +
  
The resulting profit increases in s2 at an increasing rate: 
2 2 2 2 2 42
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( 4 )( 4 8 ) 8
0,    0
8( 4( )) ( ) ( 4( ))
X Xx x
x x
q s q p s q p r q r
s s q p r s s q p r
σ σ
σ σ
+ + +∂ ∂
Π = > Π = >
∂ + + ∂ + + 3
 
 
Conditions for regime X>Y. 
( )
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
4 2 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
         [ (1 )]
( 4 )
4( 4( ))
( 4 ) ( ) 4 ( 4( ))
8 16 ( 8 16 )
          4 16 16
(4 ) (4 )( ) 4 16
X Y
y y y
x y
y x
y
x
y
s q p p
s q p r p r
s q p p r p s q p r
s pq s p q p s q s pq p r
s pq p pr
p s q p s q p r p
σ ρ
σ
σ
σ
Π > Π Σ ≡ −
+
⇔ >
+ + + Σ
⇔ + + Σ > + +
⇔ + + + + + Σ
> + +
⇔ + + + Σ − > 2xprσ
 
 
PROPOSITION 2.1. Conditions for regime X>Z. 
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 3 2 2
4 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 2
4 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
         [ (1 ),   ]
( 4 )
44( 4( ))
( 4 ) ( 4 ( ))
( 8 16 ) 4 ( )
( ) 4 (2 ) 16 4
4
X Z
z z z Z z
Zx
Z x
Z x
Z Z Z
z
D q r
s q p s q
Ds q p r
s q p D s s q q p r
s q s pq p D s q s q p r
s q D q s pq D q p D s q r
ps r
q
σ ρ
σ
σ
σ
xσ
Π > Π Σ ≡ − ≡ + Σ
+
⇔ >
+ +
⇔ + > + +
⇔ + + > + +
⇔ − + − + >
⇔ Σ +
2
2 2
2 2
16(2 ) ( ) 4z z
pr q q r r
s q
σΣ + + + Σ > 2x
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Regime X or Z favored by q. 
( )( )
2 2 2 2 22 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
( 4 ) 8 ( 4 ) ( 2 )
( >0)
4 4( 4( )) ( )
[( 4 ) 8 ( 4 )]( ) ( 2 )( 4( ))
( 4 ) 4 ( 4 ) 4 ( 2 ) 0
( 4
X Z x z
x z
x z z
z x z x z
z
s q p r s q p q q rs s
q s q p r q r
s q p r s q p q r q q r s q p r
r s q p qr r s q p r q r
r s q
σ
σ
σ σ
σ σ
+ + + + Σ∂
Π − Π ⇔ >
∂ + + + Σ
⇔ + + + + Σ > + Σ + +
⇔ Σ + − Σ + + + Σ >
⇔ Σ +
2
x
2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
2 2
) 4 0
4 4
4 4
4
x
z x z
x z x
z z
p qr
s qr qr pr
q p ps
qq
σ
σ
σ σ
− >
⇔ Σ > − Σ
− Σ
⇔ > = −
Σ Σ
 
▲
 
Conditions for regime X>YZ. 
( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
:    [Define (1 ), (1 ).]
( 4 )
44( 4( )) ( )
[(8 2 )( 4 4 ) ( 4 ) ]
0
4( 4 4 ) 4( )
                         
X YZ
y y y z z z
x y z
X YZ x
x z
s q p p s q
s q p r p r q r
q p s q s q p r s q p q
s s q p r
σ ρ σ ρ
σ
σ
σ
Π > Π Σ ≡ − Σ ≡ −
+
⇔ > +
+ + + Σ + Σ
+ + + − +∂
Π − Π = − >
∂ + +
( )
2q r+ Σ
( )
( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
22
2 2
22 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
           4 [8 ( 4 ) 2 ( 4 ) ] 0
4         0
2
( 4 )( 4( 2 ))
( 4( )) ( )
x z x z
X YZz
x
yX YZ x
x y
q r s q p r s q p
s q p
s
rs q p s q p r
p s q p r p r
σ σ
σ
σ
σ
−
−
⇔ Σ + − + Σ +
Σ+ ∂
∴ > ⇒ Π − Π >
∂
Σ+ + +∂
Π − Π = −
∂ + + + Σ
>
 
( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
22
2
( 4 ) 4 ( 4 ) 4 ( 2
4( ) ( 4( ))
         0
4
z x z xX YZ
z x
X YZz
x
s r s q p qr r s q p r q r
q q r s q p r
s p
q q
σ σ
σ
σ
−
−
Σ + − Σ + + + Σ∂
Π − Π =
∂ + Σ + +
Σ ∂
∴ + > ⇒ Π − Π >
∂
)z
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LEMMA 2.4.  Regime XY. 
( ) ( )
1/ 2 2 2
3 / 4 1/ 4
2
2 3 / 2
1/ 22
1 1( ( ) ) var
2 2 2
( + ),         
2
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 4
4
XY i
i i i i j i j i i i j i i i
i i
XY XY XY XY XY XY
i i i i i i i j j
i i i i i i i i j j
XY i
i j i j
i
r
CE e e s e e e w
p q
se p q q
sp p q q
s qs q q
r
α β τ τ γ δ τ
β γ τ β β
β γ β γ β β
β β
= + + + + + − − −
⇒ = =
⎛ ⎞
+ − + − ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ ⎝ ⎠Π = +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
−
1/ 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2 2
( 2
2
0
(1 )
( ) 0
(1 )
(
i x i yi i yj i i y yi yj
y yiXY XY XY
i i yj i y i yi yj i i
i yj
XY
XY XY i i
i i i i i i yi i y i yi yj i
i i i yi y
XY
i i i i x
i
r r
p
p p p r r
p r
p p r
β σ γ σ δ σ γ δ ρ σ σ
ρ σ
δ σ γ ρ σ σ δ γ
δ σ
β
β γ σ δ ρ σ σ γ
γ σ ρ
β σ
β
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
+ + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∂
Π = − − = ⇒ = −
∂
−∂
Π = − − + − = ⇒ =
∂ + −
∂
Π = − +
∂
∑
)
1/ 22
2 ) (4 3 ) 0
16
i j j
j j i i i
i
q qs q q
β
β β γ
β
⎛ ⎞
+ − − −
 
=⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ▲
 
PROPOSITION 2.2. Conditions for regime XY>YZ. 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
:    (1 ), ,  (1 ), 
16 (4 )( (4 ))1 1
4 4( 4 ) (4 4 )
16 (4 )( (4 ))
( 4 ) (4
XY YZ
y y y Y y z z z Z z
x y
Y Zx y x
x y
x y
D p r D q r
p r p s q pqs r p s q p s
D Dp s q r r p s q r
p r p s q pqs r p s q
p s q r r
σ ρ σ ρ
σ
σ σ
σ
σ
Π > Π Σ ≡ − ≡ + Σ Σ ≡ − ≡ + Σ
+ + + Σ +
⇔ > +
+ + Σ + +
+ + + Σ +
⇔
+ + Σ
( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
4(4 )
4 )
[16 (4 )( (4 ))]
          4(4 )[ ( 4 ) (4 4 )]
Rearranging terms yields:
(4 ) (4 ( ) 4 2 2
Z Y
Y Zx
x y Y Z
Z Y x y x
Y Z Y Z x Z Y
pD s D
D Dp s q r
p r p s q pqs r p s q D D
pD s D p s q r r p s q r
p s q pD D s qD D q r pD s q D
σ
σ
σ σ
σ
+
>
+ +
⇔ + + + Σ +
> + + + Σ + +
⇔ + + − > + +
( )
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
(4 )
(4 ) 4 2 (4 4 ) 4
Z
Y Z Y z Z x Y x
pD p s q
p s q pD D s qD r pD r p s q s q D rσ σ
+
⇔ + + Σ > + + +
 
▲
 90
Appendix B 
Some useful calculations follow. 
Covariances. 
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
cov( , ) var var ( ) ,  cov( , ) cov( , ) var
cov( , ) cov( , ) var ,  cov( , ) cov( , ) 0
t it i t i i
i i i it i i it jt i jt
x x a a k k x y a x a k
y y a y a k y y a y
σ σ
σ
= + = + = = =
= = = = =
 
Variances. 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 2 1
2
1 2 1
2 22 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
1
1 2
var( )  var var 2cov( , )
var( ) var
var( ) var
var( ) ( ) ( ) 2
where , ,
N N N N N N
i i i i i i
X X X
i i i
Y Y Y
i i i i
XY XY XY XY XY XY
i i i i i i i i
X XY Yi i
i i ix i
w w w w w w
w w B x
w w G y
w w G k n B k k m G B k
k k
B B G
k k m
σ σ
ρ
+ = + +
+ =
+ =
+ = + + + + +
= = =
+ +
2σ
1,  ( 's defined below)
XY
i iyi
i
G
k n
ρ ρ=
+
 
Expected value. 
1 1 1
11 21 1 1
1 11 21 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
1 2
ˆ[ | ] ( )
ˆ[ | , ] ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ | , , ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
where , , ,
          
i
i i
i j
i
i i i i
i
i i ix iyi i i iyj j
i j i
ix iyi iyj
k
E a x x x
k k m
k
E a y y y y
k n
E a x y y x x y y y y
k n k n k mn k k m n k k n
D D
D k k m
µ
µ
µ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
= + −
+ +
= + −
+
= + − + − + −
+ + +
≡ ≡ ≡ −
≡ 21 2 1 2 1 2[2 ( )] ( )n k k m k k n k k m+ + + + + +
 and 
j
D
 
Proof of Lemma 3.1. 
( ) ( )2 21 1
1 2
1 2 1 2
1/ 2 3/ 4 1/ 4
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1ˆ2 ( )
2 2
0
0
2 2
X X Xi
i i i i
X
X Xi i i
i iX
i
XX
j jX Xi i i
i iX X
i i
kACE x x e
k k m
ACE k ke e
e k k m k k m
kACE k ks s
k k m k k m k k m
µ τ
τ
τ τ
τ τ
= + − − −
+ +
∂
= − = ⇒ =
∂ + + + +
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − = ⇒ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ + + + +
 
+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ▲
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Proof of Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
 All propositions follow directly from the derivations and discussion in the text. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. 
( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1ˆ2 ( ) 2 2
0
0
Y Yi
i i i i i i
i
Y
Y Yi i i
i iY
i ii
Y
Y Yi ii i ii i
i iY
i ii
k
ACE y y e
k n
ACE k k
e e
k n k ne
ACE f k f k
k n k n
Yµ τ
τ τ
τ
= + − − −
+
∂
= − = ⇒ =
+ +∂
∂
= − = ⇒ =
+ +∂
 
▲
Proof of Lemma 3.3. 
( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1 1 1
1/ 2
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ2 ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
+ 0 +
0
2
Let 0,   for  , 1, 2   
XY XY XY
i i ix iyi i i iyj j j i i
XY
XY XYi
ix iyi i i ix iyiY
i
XYXY
j XYi
ix ii iyi ji iyj iXY XY
i i
ii ij
ACE x x y y y y e
ACE
e e
e
ACE s f f
f f i j
µ ρ ρ ρ τ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
τ
ρ ρ ρ τ
τ τ
= + − + − + − − −
∂
= − = ⇒ =
∂
⎛ ⎞∂
= + + − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
= = = 3 / 4 1/ 4 
2
XY
i ix
 
jx
sτ ρ ρ⇒ =
Lengthy expressions omitted from text: 
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-In3 I-3k12 k22 m2 + 2k1k2mH2k1k2 - 3 Hk1+ k2L mL n -
I12k12 k22 - 2k1k2 Hk1 + 5k2L m + 3 Ik12 + 4k1k2+ k22M m2M n2 -
2 I2k1k2 H5k1+ k2L + Ik12 - 4k1k2 - 3k22M m + 3 Hk1 + k2L m2M n3 +
Ik12 + 3 H3k2 - mL Hk2+ mL - 2k1 H11k2+ mLM n4M sM ë
I32k11ê4 k23ê4 Hk1+ nL3ê4 Hk2 + nL1ê4
Ik1k2m+ H2k1k2 + Hk1 + k2L mL n+ Hk1 + k2 + mL n2M3M  
▲
2 XY
i
i jk k
∂
=
∂
τ
 
 
  
i
k
16n2 Im2 n3 Hm + nL + k23 Hm + nL2 Hm + 2nL + k22 n Hm + nL I3m2 + 6mn+ n2M +
k2n2 I3m3 + mH-k1+ 6mL n + H-k1 + mL n2MM +
1
è k1 è k1 + n
 
Iè k2 n2è k2 + n
Ik12 I4k22 m2 + 4k2mHk2 + 2mL n+ mHk2 + 4mL n2 - 3 H2k2 + mL n3 - 3n4M +
n2 H4k2m + 3k2n + 4mnL Hmn+ k2 Hm + nLL +
k1n ImH8m- 3nL n2 + 8k2mn H2m+ nL + k22 I8m2 + 11mn + 6n2MMM s2M -
8
I-k22 n5 Hmn + k2 Hm+ nLL +
3k12 n Hmn + k2 Hm + nLL
In2 Hm + nL2 + 2k2n Hm + nL Hm+ 2nL + k22 Im2 + 4mn+ 5n2MM +
k13 Hn Hm + nL + k2 Hm+ 2nLL
In2 Hm + nL2 + 2k2n Hm + nL Hm+ 2nL + k22 Im2 + 4mn+ 5n2MM +
k1n2 I2k24 n Hm+ nL + 2m2 n3 Hm + nL + 2k2mn2 I3m2 + 6mn + 2n2M +
k22 n I6m3 + 18m2 n + 17mn2 + n3M + k23 I2m3 + 8m2 n + 15mn2 + 6n3MMM
r s2
y
{
ì
16 k1k2m+ 2k1k2 + k1 + k2 m n+ k1 + k2 + m n2 3I I H H L L H L M M  
1
XY
ik
∂Π
=
∂
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In3
II4k13 k23 m3 + 2k12 k22 m2 Hk1k2 + 6 Hk1 + k2L mL n+
k1k2mI24k12 k22 + 5k1k2 Hk1 + k2L m+ 12 Ik12 + 3k1k2+ k22M m2M n2 +
4 I6k13 k23 + 12k12 k22 Hk1 + k2L m+ k1k2 Ik12 + 3k1k2+ k22M m2 +
Hk1+ k2L Ik12 + 8k1k2+ k22M m3M n3 +
I36k12 k22 Hk1+ k2L + 18k1k2 Ik12 + 6k1k2 + k22M m+
Hk1+ k2L Ik12 + 8k1k2+ k22M m2 + 12 Ik12 + 3k1k2 + k22M m3M n4 +
2 I3k1k2 Ik12 + 10k1k2 + k22M - 3 Hk1+ k2L Ik12 - 10k1k2 + k22M m+
Ik12 + 3k1k2 + k22M m2 + 6 Hk1 + k2L m3M n5 -
I3 Hk1+ k2L Ik12 - 6k1k2+ k22M + 6 Ik12 - 6k1k2 + k22M m-
Hk1+ k2L m2 - 4m3M n6M s2 -
32è k1 è k2 è k1+ n è k2 + n
In2 In I2m2 n2 + k22 Hm+ nL2M + k12 Hm+ nL Hn Hm+ nL - 2k2 Hm+ 2nLL -
2k1k2 Ik2 Hm+ nL Hm + 2nL + 2n I2m2 + 4mn+ n2MMM +
Ik12 k22 Ik12 + k22M m2 +
k1k2mI3k1k2 Ik12 + k22M + Hk1 + k2L Ik12 + 3k1k2+ k22M mM n +
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Appendix C 
Some useful calculations: variances. 
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Proof of Lemma 4.1. 
1 2
1/ 2
1 2
0
0
2
XC
XC XCi i
i iXC
i
XCXC
j XC XCi i
i iXC XC
i i
ACE k
e
k k me
ACE ks
k k m
β
τ
β τ
τ τ
∂
= + − =
+ +∂
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + +∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
− =
 
▲Solving simultaneously for τi and rearranging terms yields Lemma 4.1. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. 
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Proof of Propositions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and Corollary 4.1. 
All propositions and the corollary follow directly from the derivations and 
discussion in the text. 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. 
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Proof of Lemma 4.4.  
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Proofs of Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6: these proofs directly parallel the proofs of Lemma 4.3 and 
Lemma 4.4, respectively. 
Lengthy expressions omitted from the text: 
( )
4 2
2 4
2 2 2 2 3 2 2
2 2
2 4
2 2 2 2
0
( )
8 16 ( ) 8 (3 ) 12 ( )
8 ( )( 2 ) 4 ( 2 )
4
4 ( 2 2 ) ( )( 2 )
XYC
i
XY
e
k
s k n
r s r k m kn k m n k m n s n k n
D
kn m n m n k m n
r
n m mn n s n k n m n
σ σ
σ
∂
<
∂
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
+⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
− + + + + + + + +⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎛ ⎞+ + + +⎢ ⎥+ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+ + + + + +⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
 
( )
2
2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2
0
2 4 ( )( 3 ) 2 ( ) (2 ( 4
XYC
i
XY
k
snr s n r n s k n k n r k n m n s
D
τ
σ σ σ
∂
<
∂
⎡ ⎤− + + + + + + +⎣ ⎦))+
 
 
 98
2
2 0
XYC
ie
k
∂
>
∂
 
I2r2 s4
I4n3 s4 + Hk + nL3 s6 +
rs2 I16n3 Hm+ 3nL + 12 Hk + nL Ik2 m+ 2k Hk+ mL n + H3k + mL n2 + 2n3M s2 + n Hk + nL3 s4M s2 +
8r2
I8n4 Hm+ 2nL +
2 I3k3 Hm+ 2nL2 + 3k2 n Hm+ 2nL H3m+ 4nL + 3kn2 I3m2 + 9mn + 8n2M +
n3 I3m2 + 9mn + 10n2MM s2 + n Hk+ nL3 Hm+ 2nL s4M s4 +
16r3 I4 Hn Hm + nL + k Hm+ 2nLL I2kn Hm + nL Hm+ 2nL + k2 Hm+ 2nL2 + n2 Im2 + 2mn + 4n2MM +
n Hk+ nL3 Hm+ 2nL2 s2M s6MM ë DXY3
  
2
2 0
XYC
i
k
τ∂
>
∂
 
I4nrs s2
Ins4 +nrs2 I4m+ 12n + 3 Hk+ nL s2M s2 +
r2 I16n2 Hm+ 2nL +4n H3k Hm+ 3nL + n H3m+8nLL s2 + Hk + nL2 Hk + 4nL s4M s4 +
2r3 I8n2 H3k Hm+ 2nL + n H3m+ 4nLL + 2 Hk + nL2 Hm+2nL H2k + 5nL s2 + n Hk+ nL3 s4M s6 +
8 k+ n 3 m+ 2n r4 2m+ n 4+ s2 s8H L H L I I MM MM ë DXY3  
 
2 XYC
ie
s k
∂
=
∂ ∂
 
I8nr2 s s4 In2 Hk + nL s2 - r I4n2 Hkm+ Hm - nL nL + Hk + nL2 Hkm+ Hm - 3nL nL s2M s2 -
Hk+ nL r2 I4k2 m2 + 8kmHk+ mL n + 4mH4k+ mL n2 + 8mn3 - 8n4 +
Hk+ nL2 HHm - 2nL n+ k Hm + 2nLL s2M s4 - 4 Hk + nL3 Hm+ 2nL Hmn + k Hm+ 2nLL r3 s6MM ë
DXY3  
 
2 XYC
i
s k
τ∂
=
∂ ∂
 
I2nr s2 In Hk + nL s4 + r s2 I-12n Hmn + k Hm+ nLL + Hk+ nL2 Hk + 4nL s2M s2 +
r2 I-16n2 Hn Hm+ nL + k Hm+ 2nLL - 12n Hk+ nL H3km+ 4kn + 3mnL s2 + Hk+ nL3 Hk+ 5nL s4M s4 +
2 Hk+ nL r3 I8 I-k2 Hm+ 2nL2 - 2kn Hm+ 2nL2 - n2 Im2 + 4mn + 2n2MM -
12n Hk+ nL H2km+ 3kn + 2mnL s2 + n Hk+ nL3 s4M s6 -
8 Hk+ nL3 Hmn + k Hm+ 2nLL r4 I2m+ n I4 + 3s2MM s8MM ë DXY3  
 
 99
1 0
XYC
s
∂Π
>
∂
  
IHk+ nL s I4nr s2 + s2 I1 + kr s2 + nr s2MM
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 8 Hm+ 2nL r s2M + n Is2 I1 + nr s2M + 4r s2 I2m + n + 2mnr s2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nr s2M + 4r s2 ImI2+ 4nr s2M + n I3 + 4nr s2MMMMM ë
I2
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 4 Hm+ 2nL r s2M + n Is2 I1 + nr s2M + 4r s2 Im+ n + mnr s2MM +
k s2 1 + 2nr s2 + 4r s2 m+ 2mnr s2 + 2n 1 + nr s2 2I I M I I MMMM M  
 
2
1
2 0
XYC
s
∂ Π
>
∂
 
IHk+ nL
I2 Hk+ nL s2 I1 + krs2 + nrs2M I4nrs2 + s2 I1+ kr s2 + nr s2MM
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 4 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 Im+ n + mnrs2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nrs2M + 4rs2 Im+ 2mnr s2 + 2n I1 + nrs2MMMM -
4 Hk+ nL s2 I1 + krs2 + nrs2M I4nrs2 + s2 I1+ krs2 + nr s2MM
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 8 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 I2m + n + 2mnr s2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nrs2M + 4rs2 ImI2+ 4nrs2M + n I3 + 4nrs2MMMM +
2s2 I1 + krs2 + nrs2M
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 4 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 Im+ n + mnrs2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nrs2M + 4rs2 Im+ 2mnr s2 + 2n I1 + nrs2MMMM
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 8 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 I2m + n + 2mnr s2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nrs2M + 4rs2 ImI2+ 4nrs2M + n I3 + 4nrs2MMMM +
I4nrs2 + s2 I1 + kr s2 + nrs2MM
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 4 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 Im+ n + mnrs2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nrs2M + 4rs2 Im+ 2mnr s2 + 2n I1 + nrs2MMMM
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 8 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 I2m + n + 2mnr s2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nrs2M + 4rs2 ImI2+ 4nrs2M + n I3 + 4nrs2MMMMMM ë
I2
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 4 Hm + 2nL rs2M + n Is2 I1 + nrs2M + 4r s2 Im + n + mnrs2MM +
k s2 1 + 2nr s2 + 4r s2 m+ 2mnrs2 + 2n 1 + nr s2 3I I M I I MMMM M  
 
 
 100
1 0
XYC
k
∂Π
<
∂
 
Irs2
I-Ik2 + 2kn +2n2M s4 - 2rs2 I4k2 m+8k Hk + mL n+ 4 H3k + mL n2 + 8n3 + n Hk + nL Hk + 2nL s2M
s2 -
2r2 I8 I2kn Hm+ nL Hm+ 2nL + k2 Hm+ 2nL2 + n2 Im2 + 2mn + 2n2MM +
4nHk+ nL2 Hm+ 2nL s2 + n2 Hk + nL2 s4 s4MMM ë DXY2   
 
2
1
2 0
XYC
k
∂ Π
<
∂
 
Ir s2
IIHk+ nL s2 + r I4 Hn Hm+ nL + k Hm+ 2nLL + Hk + nL2 s2M s2 + 4 Hk+ nL Hmn + k Hm+ 2nLL r2 s4M
I-2 Hk + nL s4 - 2rs2 In I8m+ 3n I4 + s2MM + 2k I4m+ n I8 + s2MMM s2 -
4r2 I8 Hm+ 2nL Hn Hm+ nL + k Hm+ 2nLL + 4n Hk + nL Hm+ 2nL s2 + n2 Hk + nL s4M s4M -
2Is2 + 2r I2m+ 4n+ Hk + nL s2M s2 + 8 Hn Hm+ nL + k Hm+ 2nLL r2 s4M
I-Ik2 + 2kn + 2n2M s4 -
2rs2 I4k2 m+ 8k Hk + mL n + 4 H3k+ mL n2 + 8n3 + n Hk+ nL Hk + 2nL s2M s2 -
2r2 I8 I2kn Hm+ nL Hm+ 2nL + k2 Hm+ 2nL2 + n2 Im2 + 2mn + 2n2MM +
4n Hk+ nL2 Hm+ 2nL s2 + n2 Hk + nL2 s4 s4MMMM ë DXY3  
 
2
1 0
XYC
s k
∂ Π
<
∂ ∂
 
-I16nr2 s s4 I6k2 n Hm+ nL r s2 I1+ 2nr s2M I2 Hm + 2nL rs2 + s2 I1 + nr s2MM +
k4 Hm+ 2nL r2 s4 I4 Hm+ 2nL r s2 + s2 I1 + 2nrs2MM +
mn2 I1 + nr s2M I4nrs2 I1 + mr s2 + 2nr s2M + s2 I1 + 3nr s2 + 2n2 r2 s4MM +
k3 r s2 I4m2 rs2 I1+ 4nr s2M + mI4nrs2 I3 + 14nrs2M + s2 I1 + 8nr s2 + 8n2 r2 s4MM +
n I8nr s2 I1 + 6nr s2M + s2 I1+ 12nrs2 + 12n2 r2 s4MMM +
kn I4m2 nr2 s4 I3 + 4nr s2M + n I1 + 2nr s2M2 I4nr s2 + s2 I1 + nrs2MM +
mI4nr s2 I1 + 9nr s2 + 10n2 r2 s4M + s2 I1+ 9nr s2 + 16n2 r2 s4 + 8n3 r3 s6MMMMM ë
Ik2 r s2 Is2 + 4 Hm+ 2nL r s2M + n Is2 I1 + nr s2M + 4rs2 Im + n + mnr s2MM +
k Is2 I1 + 2nr s2M + 4r s2 Im+ 2mnr s2 + 2n I1 + nr s2MMMM3  
 101
 102
Glossary 
ci Cost of effort for agent i (i=1,2) 
ei Individual effort by agent i (i=1,2) 
τi Cooperative effort (teamwork) by agent i (i=1,2) 
pi Task expertise for agent i (i=1,2) 
qi Team expertise for agent i (i=1,2) 
ri Coefficient of risk aversion for agent i (i=1,2) 
s Level of synergy in team output 
wi Compensation contract for agent i (i=1,2) 
x Team output  
yi Performance measure of agent i’s individual effort contribution (i=1,2) 
zi Performance measure of agent i’s cooperative effort contribution (i=1,2) 
αi Fixed wage for agent i (i=1,2) 
βi Incentive weight for agent i (i=1,2) on team output, x 
γi Incentive weight for i (i=1,2) on his measure of individual effort, yi 
δi Incentive weight for i (i=1,2) on agent j’s individual effort measure, yj 
κi Incentive weight for i (i=1,2) on his measure of cooperative effort, zi 
λi Incentive weight for i (i=1,2) on agent j’s cooperative effort measure, zj 
ρn Correlation between performance measures ni and nj (n = y, z) 
σn2 Variance of performance measure n (n = x, yi, yj, zi, zj) 
Σn2 Variance of performance measure n, net of correlation 
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